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IHTRODOCTION 
Development of a model which allows a realistic simulation of 
operator responses to complex accident scenarios in nuclear power 
plants is a very ambitious undertaking and will only be possible 
at present if all the simplifying assumptions are taken into 
consideration which this specific aim of the simulation makes 
feasible. The simulation model considered in this report is 
intended for incorporation in an integrated simulation model 
which can support a systematic identification of the accidental 
courses of events which have to be considered in an exhaustive 
probabilistic risk analysis. One of the fundamental problems in 
such analyses is at present explicitly to formulate the search 
strategy applied to define the relevant scenarios, and thus to 
delimit the coverage (Rasmussen, 1982). One approach to this 
problem will be to have a simulation model which is capable, in a 
systematic way, of generating system responses to all relevant 
component faults and their combinations. For this to be effective 
in risk management, a well defined coverage determined by 
explicitly described principles for the search is more important 
than to seek the widest possible coverage by use of ad hoc expert 
intuition and imagination. Well defined coverage is important in 
order to make it possible to decide a posteriori whether a given 
accidental event was in fact included (Rasmussen and Pedersen, 
1984). 
For the technical part of an industrial process plant, the DYIAH 
simulation program (Reina and Amanda, 1981; Amendola, 1984) can 
systematically identify the accidental courses of events to 
consider. This is done by defining the relevant fault modes for 
all components, and by a complete search through all these modes 
and their combinations to the order defined by the analyst. A 
similar exhaustive search for all possible erroneous human acts 
is clearly not possible, and a set of delimiting assumptions and 
principles have to be chosen. Such principles are proposed in the 
next section, and are intended to add up to an evolutionary 
approach in which a model is developed in sequential stages of 
- 8 -
refinement together with a program for concurrent testing of the 
assumptions. 
BASIC PRINCIPLES .AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The requirements from risk analysis« Important simplifications 
can be drawn from the intended application of identifying the 
sources of events to include in risk analysis in addition to 
those having their origin in technical faults. In the first 
approximation, the model is only intended to identify the 
relevant scenarios to analyze, not to supply quantitative 
probability figures. Therefore, failure modes having effects 
identical with those of technical components need not to be 
considered; only modes of human errors adding branches to the 
fault tree already defined by the DYLAM program will have to be 
considered. As we will see, this in fact means that we do not 
have to consider simple, separate human errors affecting 
component performance, only those adding causal coupling between 
otherwise independent events. Even when quantitative predictions 
are not intended as in this first approximation, it should, 
however, be noted that a stop rule for the search for which error 
modes to include will in fact imply a ranking according to 
frequencies as well as the consideration of a probability cut-off 
limit. 
Another simplifying principle can be drawn from the present 
application. The basic requirement is not to have, in the first 
approximation, a reliable simulation of operator performance, but 
a simulation generatina an envelope including the relevant 
responses, based on explicitly known principles. The resulting 
fault tree can be screened for irrelevant responses during the 
subsequent quantification of probabilities. 
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Aspects of human adaptation. Another set of simplifying 
principles can be based on the adaptive features of human 
behavior. Highly skilled human operators have successfully 
adapted to the control requirements of the particular plant 
during all operating conditions normally met. During such 
circumstances, their behavior will only reflect characteristics 
of the plant, not of their cognitive mechanisms. As Simon 
phrased it: NA man, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. 
The apparent complexity of his behavior over time is largely a 
reflection of the complexity of th? environment in which he finds 
himself. A thinking human is an adaptive system — . To the 
extent he is effectively adaptive, his behavior will reflect 
characteristics largely of the outer environment (in the light of 
his goals) and will reveal only a few limit i n properties of his 
inner environment - of the physiological machinery that enables 
him to think." (Simon 1969, p.25). 
A model of successful operator performance during familiar work 
situations sail, therefore. be considered a mode* of the 
requirements of the work environment, considering his immediate 
goals. To make it a model of human performance, it will then be 
necessary to add the mechanisms that come into play when 
adaptation breaks down, i.e., a model of relevant human error 
mechanisms. 
A model of human error mechanisms appears to be feasible for the 
present application where the focus will be on those error modes 
which will tend to introduce systematic or likely coupling 
between otherwise independent events or acts. Previous analyses 
of events including human errors (Rasmussen, 1981; Rasmussen et 
al., 1981) tend to show that a wide variety of observable errors 
during unfamiliar work situations can in fact be explained by a 
fairly low number of psychological mechanisms related to human 
adaptability (Rasmussen, 1985), and can be seen as the 
manifestation of interference in performance during infrequent 
plant disturbances from the vast repertoire of more or less 
automated routines. This is in good accordance with recent 
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findings in psychological research indicating that fundamental 
principles such as striving for similarity matching and choosing 
the path of least effort are underlying the most significant 
systematic error mechanisms (Reason, 1985a,b). Consequently, a 
model of the behavior of skilled operators, including a 
representation of error mechanisms, will as a basic ingredient 
include a representation of the total task repertoire including 
in particular the highly automated daily routines. 
In this way, the simulation model will serve to identify 
systematically the triggers for these systematic human error 
mechanisms which may inadvertently be designed, instructed, or 
trained into an industrial process system. 
From these arguments, it will be realized that the basic 
ingredients of a model of operator performance will be a model of 
the total task repertoire representing the "perfect operator" 
together with a model of the learning and error mechanisms which 
add the human perspective. 
A model of the task repertoire will, consequently, be a major 
part of the development required. Different approaches to this 
part of the project seem to be possible, and will require further 
analysis. The traditional approach will be a classical task 
analysis, which has, in fact, been made for nuclear power plants. 
It will, however, be a major task to obtain all the necessary 
data, in particular since it is not the formal but the actual 
procedures which are needed, even for daily routines. It may be 
argued that the collection of descriptions of operator task 
sequences and related error data is as important for quantitative 
risk analysis as the collection of data on component 
specifications and fault modes. 
Another approach worth a closer look will be to generate the task 
repertoire from a systematic analysis QI the plant control 
requirements. To make this approach feasible, a systematic 
representation of the control requirements in terms of a means-
end hierarchy including the basic intentions behind design 
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decisions will be needed. This approach requires a data 
collection program which would, however, be needed also for the 
design of advanced operator decision support systems. Derivation 
from control requirements will identify required task sequences 
with many degrees of freedom with respect to operator's choice of 
the order of acts in parts of the tasks, and should be 
supplemented by heuristic rules related to human adaptation, or 
derived from interviews of operating staffs. 
Finally, the possibility of identifying relevant task information 
from systematic interrogation of operators should be carefully 
considered, using recently developed methods for expert knowledge 
acquisition. Again some basic assumptions about human adaptation 
may serve to simplify the modelling. The mechanisms underlying 
errors in terms of interference from frequently encountered tasks 
or concepts seem to be closely related to the mechanisms of 
memory access and may be accessible by means of metacognitive 
judgments when used for systematic interrogation (Reason, 1985b). 
Finally, the model should be compatible with the DYLAM simulation 
concept. Simulation of a process plant is usually structured in a 
set of differential equations derived from balance considerations 
related to the system performance at the level of thermodynamic 
relations. In that case, mapping of physical changes will be 
rather complicated. Simulation models can also be based on a 
library of component models representing component functions 
including a set of component failure functions, as is the case in 
the JRC DYLAM program. The latter gives a simple mapping of 
changes caused by component failures, and can systematically 
generate a complete set of possible event trees. Relevant 
accident scenarios are found by selection. In this case, the 
system is decomposed into physical components for which 
operational states .'ve defined according to fault modes. The 
possible failed system states are then generated by weans of 
scanning through the standard component states and sorting out 
the relevant system consequences. 
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Figure 1. Structure of accidental course of 
events in a process plant design according 
to the "defanse in depth" philosophy. 
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In order to do the same for the operator performance, operator 
behavior should be decomposed into task elements or actions, 
which may be erroneous due to basic human error modes. In that 
case, operator performance should be modelled by a representation 
of the proper task sequence, and erroneous responses generated by 
a systematic search through a library of relevant error modes. 
The model approach suggested above, therefore, appears to be 
immediately applicable in the DYLAM framework. 
SELECTION OF TASK8 TO INCLUDE IN THE MODEL 
In order to simplify the model of emergency responses, it will be 
important to formulate the requirements from the present specific 
application of the model. The operator activities to include in 
the causal simulation structure can be identified with reference 
to the anatomy of a typical accident, see Figure 1, and the 
internal structure of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) which 
are in turn the prerequisites for the DYLAM simulation approach. 
The rationale of a PRA for systems with extreme safety require-
ments such as nuclear installations, depends on the system design 
concept applied for such plants, leading to a well structured 
pattern of propagation of accidents. In consequence of the design 
philosophy applied, the relevant accident scenarios can be 
grouped and studied collectively, and safety measures can be 
related to the individual groups by use of a feed back control 
principle. In addition, accident propagation can be considered to 
occur in several subsequent phases subject to control by 
counter-measures based on different physical principles. This 
"defence-in-depth" design philosophy makes it possible to achieve 
in a realistic very low probability of an accident with moderate 
requirements to the probability of the events related to the 
individual phases of the course of events, given the assumption 
of mutual independence. 
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Wit-h reference to such general features of an accident sequence, 
the categories of human activities which should be included in a 
simulation model can be identified using the consideration that 
only such activities should be included that will add new 
branches to the resulting fault and event trees. Activities will 
not be included if they are merely contributing to the frequency 
or probability of chains of events which already found from 
consideration of technical faults. For example, simple errors 
during human activities in terms of omission of acts or acts that 
otherwise influence only the reliability of the intended outcome 
of the task, need not be considered since their consequences will 
be identical with a lack of response of the technical part 
involved in the acts. What should in particular be included are 
human errors which have effects adding coupling and cross links 
to the physical, causal structure. Such links will introduce 
coincidence between events related to parts of the physical 
system which are otherwise functionally independent. 
Two categories of such causal links should, in particular, be 
considered: 
One is the systematic source of common mode faults which may be 
introduced when a basic human error mechanism may lead to oper-
ation on a wrong component. In such a case, the lack of a proper 
act on one component will be coupled to an erroneous act on 
another. Identification of such links between components which 
may be functionally unrelated will serve to avoid the combina-
torial run-away which will result from purely combinatorial 
search for relevant common-mode failures. 
Typically, this category will result in couplings within one 
phase of the accident sequence. The category will probably be 
most important for activities during maintenance, test, and 
calibration, including activities during work planning and 
scheduling for such activities, in particular related to 
redundant protection systems. Characteristically, such activities 
are of the rule-based domain. The work conditions and, 
consequently, the related typical error mechanisms will be de-
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coupled from the dynamics of a particular accidental chain of 
events. Therefore, a reasonable amount of general empirical 
evidence will be available, and it will be possible to take 
account of the influence in fault tree construction, without 
including the activities in a dynamic simulation. 
Another source of causal cross-links is more important for 
consideration in dynamic simulation, namely the possibility of 
causal links between the phases of the accidental sequence, i.e., 
between the initiation of an accidental sequence and the 
performance of the protective systems. Protective systems are 
basically feed back control systems serving to maintain the 
operational state of a system within the acceptable, safe domain. 
In all systems based on feedback principles, the performance is 
very sensitive to disturbances of the feed back path. In the 
present context, operator interaction with the safety systems 
during accidental chains of events is, therefore, of prime 
importance. The operator-plant interaction will be very situation 
specific, and the relevant error mechanisms can only be 
identified from a joint, dynamic simulation of operator and plant 
behaviour. Two categories of human activities will be important 
in this respect. One is the protective tasks which are directly 
allocated the operating staff, such as control of emergency 
cooling systems, standby equipment, etc. Another will be the 
erroneous interference with automatic safety functions due to 
misunderstanding of the observed functioning. Such interference 
may be due to errors during unrelated activities caused by, in 
itself correct, use of a procedure which, however, owing to 
particular circumstances is counterproductive. The identification 
of activities to consider can be approached from different points 
of view. The starting point can be analysis of a task sequence, 
searching for the effect of human errors (error mode and effect 
analysis). Another can be search for tasks which may influence a 
given system component, identified by the fault tree analysis. 
In conclusion, for a first approximation, focus should be on 
modelling the operator interaction with the protective systems of 
the plant, automatically as well as manually controlled, and only 
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for those error modes that will give rise to additional couplings 
in the causal structure, in particular across phases in the 
accidental course of events. 
MODEL OF THB TASK REPERTOIRE 
It follows from the discussion so far that an important part of 
the model will be a representation of the operator's task 
repertoire, not only the tasks directly related to the emergency 
response scenarios, but also all the frequent, normal work 
routines which may be the source of interference during non-
normal situations. Depending upon the search heuristics applied 
to guide the scanning of error modes, operator tasks will have to 
be represented in one of two different ways in the data base of 
the simulation model: 
1. Tasks which are directly involved in the course of events that 
are simulated. These tasks will be selected from the point of 
view of their possible contribution of new branches to the fault 
trees which are the ultimate outcome of the DYLAM system. It will 
not be necessary to include tasks which merely change the 
frequency, or probability of events in the simulation. Together 
with the automatic functions, these tasks will be the potential 
targets of errors and interference. 
2. Tasks which can be the potential sources of interference with 
the protective functions and tasks included in the simulated 
scenarios. This set includes a representation of the total task 
repertoire, in particular the "overtrained" daily routines. It 
should, however, be considered whether the selection of tasks to 
include can be made by considering only tasks which have action 
sequence elements or action objects having close relation to the 
sensitive targets. 
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For both categories, criteria for the selection of tasks to be 
included In the model framework are similar to the completeness 
criteria for risk analysis: It is more important to know the 
boundaries than it is to have a complete model. 
Different approaches to the problem of representing the task 
repertoire should be considered: The classical approach to task 
analysis, the systematic derivation from the control requirements 
of the plant, and interrogation of operating staffs. 
Task analysis. This approach will involve a considerable amount 
of work. A recent report (Burgy et al., 1983) describes a major 
effort to analyze the task repertoire of operating crews. The 
result has been a computerized data base including 45 operating 
sequences, with 1062 tasks, including 15,378 task elements. Data 
are collected from eight nuclear plants, seven simulators, one 
actual control room, and one mock-up. The data have been col-
lected by operations personnel and human factors specialists, but 
are limited to observable task characteristics. 
The task analysis is based en Miller's (1963) development. A task 
is defined as the human performance needed to accomplish required 
system functions independent of the individual who performs it. 
The entire "single thread" analysis can be considered as a set of 
links sequentially connected with little, if any, interaction or 
branching in the link structure. 
A controlled vocabulary is used for the analysis. A top-down job 
function analysis is used to identify and interrelate the de-
tailed task sequences. A task may be performed on different 
occasions in support of different subfunctions, an operating 
sequence is a collection of tasks supporting a specific 
subfunction. Several operating sequences may be performed 
simultaneously by different crew mebers. Criteria for task 
selection have been: frequency, criticality, NRC interest, and 
usability in a "NUREG 0700" review. 
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Data collection Includes analysis of operating procedures, 
rehearsal of procedure with plant crew to clarify and Identify 
personnel roles, and finally on-site observation. 
Task descriptions include: 
"Operating sequence overviews" for each sequence to be studied. 
"Task sequence charts" identifying the individual elements. The 
table entries are: sequence no., task and purpose, cue, procedure 
name and number, and system name. 
"Task data forms" identifies: person, location, time, function 
(behavior element), object of action with state and action, means 
(cue), and communication link. 
A "supplementary task data form" identifies: task difficulty, 
consequence of error, and criticality of timing; all by qualita-
tive ranking. The data base is extensive and retrieval by com-
puter search is possible, for instance for automatic "link 
analyses". Unfortunately, however, for the present purpose, the 
data recorded are not specific enough. The information used to 
activate task performance ("cues"), for instance, is stated in 
very general terms, like: "instrument", "procedure", or "verbal". 
The report will be useful in organizing a suitable data 
collection, to estimate the amount of resources required, and as 
a basic structure for collecting the procedures. Therefore, a 
realistic simulation model of human performance during emergency 
situations will require a substantial task analysis, not only in 
terms of formal procedures, but in fact all the normally 
acceptable variations of procedures in the work repertoire along 
the lines proposed by Pedersen (1985). This task data collection 
should, however, also be carefully planned with respect to 
obtaining task frequency data, etc., when planning the simulation 
of the "cue scanning strategy" of operators discussed in the 
human error section below. 
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In the general context of data banks for risk and reliability 
analysis, it should be considered whether the data banks in-
cluding technical component descriptions, their fault modes and 
frequencies, should also include operator task descriptions in 
terms of subroutines with activation cues, in order to have a 
meaningful basis for including systematic human errors in the 
analysis of response to unfamiliar task requirements. 
Derivation from control reguirements. Since successful task 
performance in fact reflects successful adaptation to the control 
reguirements of the process plant in question, another 
possibility of modelling the performance of the "perfect oper-
ator" will be the systematic derivation of the control sequences 
required to meet the operating goals, e.g., to maintain a 
specified state or to transfer the plant from one specified state 
to another. Such a systematic control sequence derivation must be 
based on a consistent representation of the demands and resources 
in terms of the purpose / function / process / equipment mapping 
of a means-end hierarchy. 
In general, a procedure is a set of rules which describe how 
actions on the plant should be made if a certain system goal 
should be accomplished. The sequencing of actions depend on plant 
structure and functional properties, on the nature of the control 
task considered, and on the operating constraint, e.g., with 
respect to safety requirements. 
In principle, an operating procedure can be systematically 
identified by a decomposition of the goal and constraint set of 
the operating mode considered, top-down through the means-end 
hierarchy. The result will be a logically consistent specifi-
cation of a set of concurrent and sequential actions on physical 
components of the plant. The decomposition will be controlled by 
the causal topology of the plant at the various levels, and a 
systematic tool for this derivation can be the multi-level flow 
model proposed by Lind (1981, 1982), based on a consistent 
representation of the mass, energy, and information flow 
topology. 
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In the operation of a process plant, a distinction can be drawn 
between two categories of control which are related to different 
aspects of the coordination of plant functions. These categories 
are important for the discussion of task, structures. 
The first category includes the control functions provided for 
optimization and for maintaining plant integrity during 
transients caused by external disturbances or by programmed 
changes in the operating conditions as, e.g., changes of set-
points. Characteristic of this type of control functions is that 
they are provided for a certain operating regime, i.e., they are 
not applicable if the operating regime is changed. In material 
and energy processing plants, such as nuclear power plants, this 
category of control functions performs a coordination of the 
redistribution of mass and energy stored in plant components, and 
such coordination problems are related to plant operations where 
structural changes do not occur. 
The secord category of controls includes coordination problems 
related to changes in plant functional structure. This occurs 
when an integrated process must be established from a set of 
hitherto functionally unrelated plant components, as for instance 
during startup, or when establishing ad hoc safety functions. In 
order to allow process components to be connected, operational 
conditions for the separate components must be equalized. (A 
boiler must be filled, heated, and produce steam before it can be 
connected to the turbine. The turbine must be at correct speed 
before it can be synchronized with the grid, etc.). 
The division of a control task into subtasks according to the 
categories above leads to a decomposition of the associated goal 
and procedure into subgoals and subprocedures. Furthermore, to 
each task a plant subsystem corresponds which again is divided 
into subsubsystems by the task decomposition. However, plant 
subsystems obtained in this way will in general be overlapping, 
i.e., they will share components because the goal decomposition 
is based on the functional requirements and not on the physical 
structure. Therefore, a systematic framework is necessary in 
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order to consider all goals and constraints (also related to 
possible latent fault conditions) in the procedure design, and 
the application of Lind1s approach should be tested. It will be 
noted that the resulting hierarchical task/goal structure has 
similarities with the hierarchical task analysis and description 
presently under development at the JRC-center Ispra (private 
communication, August 1985), and with the structure proposed by 
Reason et al. (1985). 
The control procedures derived from plant control requirements in 
this way will have several degrees of freedom in the final 
sequencing. Functionally speaking, the sequential order in 
smaller or larger parts of a control sequence will be unspecified 
and can be chosen from other types of criteria such as minimizing 
operator motion etc. Operator heuristics and criteria for choice 
may be important, since there will be a tendency to apply them 
also in cases where safety considerations dictate task sequences 
which are Mirrelevant" during normal circumstances, but important 
as conditional protection against potential failure states. 
Systematic generation of the control sequence requirements will 
result in a family of acceptable procedures for each task, and 
all members of a family should probably be considered as a basis 
for perturbation according to the error mode search unless clear 
evidence for operator preferences can be found. In addition, it 
should be considered to what extent a systematic analysis can 
identify those parts of a control sequence for which the physical 
and functional properties of the plant will guarantee error 
detection by blocking further actions if not corrected. For these 
aspects of the sequence analysis, Pedersen's (1985), procedures 
for work analysis should be considered for further development. 
This approach will also invite a number of questions concerning 
the necessary data base. A systematic representation of the 
system properties in terms of the means-end abstraction hierarchy 
will be necessary. This in turns raises the problem of an 
i 
explicit formulation of the top-down propagation of the 
intentional basis of system design. Such information is typically 
implicitly imbedded in industrial practices, or only present as 
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subjective and unformulated preferences of the designer. An 
attempt to formulate the information will, however, have general 
interest, since it is exactly this kind of information which is 
needed for design of decision support systems for the operators 
during disturbed system operation, i.e., the information will be 
needed for the design of "expert systems" intended for on-line 
decision support. 
In consequence, an important study for supplying the data base 
for systematic generation of the task repertoire, operatina 
procedures, as well as for design of expert system support of 
operators will be the development of a data base representina the 
design intentions in terms of. a consistent 
purpose/function/process/ equipment mapping fmeans-end represen-
tation) . 
Interrogation of operators by more indirect means should be 
considered a tool for modelling the task repertoire. Recent 
research (Reason, 1985b) seems to indicate that humans are rather 
good at metacognitive judgments of frequencies of encounter of 
concepts, events, objects, etc., and since the predominant 
feature of task interference seems to be frequency of encounter 
together with "cue overlap", indirect methods by which operating 
teams are asked to "spew-out" examplars of categories and to rank 
frequency of occurrence of cues and task elements may turn out to 
be a selective and, therefore effective, alternative to the more 
traditional task analysis. In this respect it will be important 
to consider the basic organization of performance, discussed in 
detail in a subsequent section. 
Behaviour is composed of sequences of skill-based subroutines, 
which roll off as integrated smooth units without conscious 
control of the chaining of the individual acts when activated by 
the proper intention to act. At the rule-based level, such 
subroutines are chained by choosing those suitable for the 
occasion according to know-how or prior experience. If a problem 
is at hand and no useful task sequence is available, knowledge-
based "experiments" by meanr of a mental model may be necessary 
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to predict the outcome and compare it with relevant goals in 
order to generate a plan. Only the skill- and rule- based levels 
will be considered in the interrogation of operating staffs. 
Skilled routines are activated as integrated task sequences by an 
intention or choice, and they will be the elements of the task 
data base. More complex task sequences controlled at the rule-
based level are composed of such routines, which are individually 
activated by a cue-set including observation of indicators and 
the result of the antecedent act. An important study will be to 
ask operators, by use of metacognitive judgement techniques, to 
list frequencies of the routines and to judge the likelihood of 
their chaining. According to the findings of Reason (private 
communication, 1985), well planned questioning techniques should 
be able to establish antecedent action links, relevant cue sets, 
and frequency of encounter, i.e., to generate the nfrequent-task-
interference-source •• data base. 
MODELLING OPERATOR PERFORMANCE 
From the introductory discussion it follows that a model of the 
error free operator represents only task characteristics, and 
that representation of human limiting properties and error 
provoking mechanisms is necessary in order to make it a model of 
human characteristics. The fact that emergency procedures are 
carefully formulated in advance, and extensively trained on 
training simulators, together with the dependence of systematic 
errors on interference with very familiar task situations focus 
the efforts of the initial modelling upon models at the skill-
rule based level. Consulting the review of available model con-
cepts (Appendix 1) it appears that the descriptive framework 
offered by the Brunswick lens model should be a useful concept. 
- 24 -
Arguments for the lens model (figure 2) by Brunswik (1957) are 
based on the need for judgment because knowledge of the 
environment is difficult due to "causal ambiguity". Reference is 
made to Brunswick and Tolman who emphasized that 
"the organism in its intercourse with the environment must 
cope with numerous, independent, multiformal relations among 
variables which are partly relevant and partly irrelevant 
to its purpose, which carry only a limited amount of 
dependability, and which are organized in a variety of ways. 
The problem for the organism, therefore, is to know its 
environment under these complex circumstances. In the effort 
to do so, the organism brings a variety of processes 
(generally labelled cognitive), such as perception, 
learning, and thinking, to bear on the problem of reducing 
causal ambiguity. As a part of this effort, human beings 
often attempt to manipulate variables (by experiments, for 
example) and sometimes succeed - in such a manner as to 
eliminate ambiguity. But when the variables cannot be 
manipulated, human beings must use their cognitive resources 
unaided by manipulation or experiment. They must do the best 
they can by passive rather than active means to arrive at a 
conclusion regarding a state of affairs clouded by causal 
ambiguity. They must, in short, exercise their judgment. 
Human judgment is a cognitive activity of last resort." 
(p.272). 
This description appears to be close to the conditions of judge-
ment for process operators. Also the role of the "internal 
dynamic world model" (Rasmussen, 1986) or "process feel" is in 
correspondence with the lens model approach. Tolman and Brunswick 
(1935) react to the notion of information "input". Both argued 
that the objects and events apprehended by an organism do more 
— and less — than "impinge" upon it. Not only does the organism 
cognitively act on the "input", but the perceived object carries 
implications for other objects. That is why Tolman's position was 
labelled an S-S theory, (sign-significate) and contrasted to S-R 
theories. Because "cues" and "sign-significates" point outward, 
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Judgment 
- £, hs- Xi + I i=l i 
r = Ecological correlations 
r - Response correlations 
h ,h = Optimum regression weights 
Figure 2. Brunswik's lens model. This model is 
a descriptive model of human judgement developed 
within the social judgement paradigm. 
See Appendix 1 for details. 
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they involve a relation between two variables - proximal and 
distal, the given and the inferred. Choice of that relation as 
the fundamental unit of cognition has profound consequences, of 
course, and it was this choice which eventually led Tolman to 
introduce the concept of "mental map" in 1948; he argued that 
cognition involves a subjective representation of the goal paths 
in the environment of the organism. Brunswick went further; he 
demanded a more detailed analysis of the environment and a less 
detailed analysis of the organism. Environment and organism 
should be described in symmetrical terms. The lens model there-
fore considers symmetrically the ecological validity of cues, and 
the subject's cue utilization. 
Central to social judgment theory is the distinction between 
surface and depth of the environment, surface data are (given) 
cues to the (inferred) depth conditions in the judgment task. The 
intervening region between surface and depth has been named zone 
of ambiguity. The relation is considered a cause (depth) - effect 
(surface) relation. Because a single effect may be produced by 
several causes, as well as because multiple effects may be 
produced by a single cause, there is ambiguity from cause to 
effect and from effect to cause. Because causes may be 
interrelated and because effects are interrelated, the network of 
task relations can be said to be entangled. Moreover, causal 
ambiguity is produced because (1) surface data are less than 
perfectly related to depth variables, (2) functional relations 
between surface and depth variables may assume a variety of forms 
(linear, curve-1inear), and (3) the relations between surface and 
depth may be organized according to a variety of principles (for 
example, additive or pattern). These circumstances give more 
specific meaning to the term "causal texture" or causal 
"ambiguity". 
Objectives for social judgment theory are stated to be: 
1. Real life relevance. 
2. A descriptive, not a law-seeking theory. 
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3. Aids to improve human judgment, for instance by dis-
playing pictorially the weights, function forms, and un-
certainties in persons' judgment policies as well as in 
judgment tasks. 
The central features of the lens model concept, i.e., the focus 
on a descriptive model with equal emphasis on the representation 
of the task environment and the human response, are clearly 
compatible with the needs in the present context. In some re-
spects, however, reference to the "lens model" concept may be 
misleading, because the label refers to a methodological 
paradigm, rather than merely to a model structure, and the 
similarity to the present approach may be judged a verisimilitude 
at the present state of the development. However, being a purely 
descriptive framework, it matches the needs of a rule-based model 
very well. 
The basic structure is the following: 
A state in the task environment has to be identified from a set 
of observable cues, and a judgment made regarding the identity of 
this state. In the classical use of the model for experimental 
work within the social judgment paradigm, one of the problems is 
the match between the cues used for experimental work, and the 
cues actually used in the real life condition (as it is discussed 
in appendix 1 ). In the present application, this problem will be 
less pronounced, because the cues for judgment in a modern 
control room are related to discrete instrument indications. In 
the model, two sources of uncertainty are considered. One is cue 
reliability related to the fact that the "distal variable" which 
should be inferred from the cues may not be deterministically 
related to the cues available, a feature which may be used to 
represent, e.g., unreliable indications. Another is the cue 
utilization, i.e., the use of the available "proximal variables" 
for inference, reflecting the less-than-optimal use of cues by 
human judges. 
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The structure of the model proposed in the present approach is 
illustrated in fig. 3: 
The relationship between the actual state of the process to be 
controlled and the cue set available to the operator, is 
perturbated (a) by the possible choice by the interface designer 
of a non-defining set of measured data, and (b) by the possibly 
unreliable measurement sensors. These perturbations represent the 
technical reliability of the control room indications. 
Another perturbation function is used to represent the operator's 
cue utilization, i.e., to select the set of instrument or alarm 
messages which are included in the set by which the operator 
selects the task to perform. This perturbation function reflects 
the human error mechanisms or "judgment biases", and will be 
discussed in detail below. 
The resulting, selected cue set is used to enter a decision table 
including the task repertoire, and a task is activated for 
execution. However, the task activated may not be successfully 
completed. Another perturbation function analyzes the match be-
tween elements of the current task and other tasks of the 
repertoire. If a match fulfilling certain conditions specified by 
the perturbation function is found, this task sequence will 
complete the (then erroneous) task sequence. The cues applied may 
not be quantitatively well defined, and fuzzy set models will 
probably be very well suited to represent cues, if the membership 
functions can be adequately formulated. 
It will be seen that the model reflects the control requirements 
of the plant in terms of the proper task repertoire. Human 
features are represented only in terms of perturbation functions. 
It will also be seen that the structure of the model matches the 
requirements of the DYLAM simulation system (Amendola et al. 
1984, Cacciabue, 1986). The cue-set/proper-task data base 
represents a decision table model of the correctly performing 
operator and a specification of the perturbation function will 
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Figure 3. Information flow in s imulat ion of opera tor 
responses in process c o n t r o l . Based on Brunswik's lens 
model and the human e r ro r taxonomy of Rasmussen e t a l . , 
1981. 
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make it possible in a systematic way to scan through the relevant 
error modes in an "error-mode-and-effect analysis similar to the 
one applied for technical component faults. The human element is 
represented by the perturbation functions which will be 
considered in more detail being a representation of the human 
error mechanisms. 
In the previous sections it has been discussed that the model of 
the perfect operator is in fact a representation of the control 
requirements of the plant. The human element is "shining through1* 
in terms of error mechanisms when adaptation breaks down. In the 
present modelling approach, the human element will be represented 
only in order to generate heuristic rules serving to limit the 
combinatorial search through the possible perturbations of the 
proper cue utilization. 
The approach is based on the assumption that the systematic error 
mechanisms which are in focus according to the previous dis-
cussion, are related to interference between the actual task 
requirements during disturbed task condition and more frequently 
applied members of the task repertoire (Rasmussen 1985). This is 
in accordance with recent psychological research (Reason, 1985b). 
The review of error shaping factors, given by Reason et al. 
(1985) illustrates clearly the dependence on intertask or inter-
situation interference. 
The table reflects the relationship between different categories 
of human error, and modes of cognitive control. (See page 31). 
Clearly, interference in a task repertoire will have a different 
basis in the different behavioral domains, a basis which can be 
related to different levels of abstraction in the behavioral 
control, and the skill- rule- knowledge- framework will be used 
to distinguish such levels of cognitive control (Rasmussen 1983). 
When we distingui sh categories of human behavior according to 
basically different ways of representing the regularit '. .*• of the 
behavior of a deterministic task environment, '.mree typical 
levels of control emerge: skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based 
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performance. These levels and a simplified illustration of their 
interrelation are shown in fig. 4. Skill-based behavior 
represents sensorimotor performance during acts or activities 
that, after a statement of an intention, take place without 
conscious control as smooth, automated, and highly integrated 
patterns of behavior. In most skilled sensorimotor tasks, the 
body acts as a multivariable, continuous control system 
synchronizing movements with the behavior of the environment, and 
performance is based on feed-forward control and depends upon a 
very flexible and efficient dynamic internal world model. 
Performance rolls along without any conscious choice between 
action alternatives. 
BEHAVIORAL DOMAIN ERROR SHAPING FACTORS 
SKILL-BASED 1. Recency and frequency of previous use 
2. Environmental control signals 
3. Shared scheme properties 
4. Concurrent plans 
RULE-BASED 1. Mind set ("It's- always-worked-before") 
2. Availability ("First-come-best-preferred") 
3. Matching bias ("like-relates-to-like") 
4. Over-confidence ("I'm-sure-I'm-right11) 
5. Over-simplification (e.g., "halo-effect") 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
(Not considered for simulation at this stage) 
In general, human activities can be considered as a sequence of 
skilled subroutines composed for the actual occasion. The 
flexibility of skilled performance is due to the ability to 
compose from a large repertoire of automated subroutines the sets 
suited for specific purposes. 
At the next level of rule-based behavior, the composition of such 










Effects of linear thought in causal not: 
- CAUSAL C0N0ZTI0N8 NOT CONSIDERED 




















FORQET ISOLATED I T E M 








MOTOR V A R I A B I L I T Y 
TOPOGRAPHIC 
MISORIENTATION 
Figure 4 . Typical human " e r r o r " mechanisms and t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n to con t ro l of behaviour . (Adopted from Ras-
mussen (1980) with permission from John Wiley & Sons, 
L t d . ) . 
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typically consciously controlled by a stored rule or procedure 
that may have been derived empirically during previous occasions, 
communicated from other persons' know-how as an instruction or 
cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on occasion by conscious 
problem solving and planning. The point here is that performance 
is goal-oriented, but structured by "feed-forward control" 
through a stored rule. Very often, the goal is not even 
explicitly formulated, but is found implicitly in the situation 
releasing the stored rules. The control is teleologic only in the 
sense that the rule or control is selected from previous 
successful experiences. The control evolves by "survival of the 
fittest" rule. In effect, the rule will reflect the functional 
properties that constrain the behavior of the environment, but 
usually those properties found empirically in the past. 
Furthermore, in actual life, the goal will only be reached after 
a long sequence of acts, and direct feedback correction 
considering the goal may not be possible. Feedback correction 
during performance will require functional understanding and 
analysis of the current response of the environment which may be 
considered an independent, concurrent activity at the next higher 
level (knowledge-based). 
The rule-based coordination is in general ba&sd on explicit know-
how, and the rules used can be reported by the person, although 
the cues releasing a rule may be difficult to describe. This 
level of cognitive control includes those situations when action 
alternatives are known, and a choice has to be made. 
During unfamiliar situations, faced with an environment for which 
no know-how or rules for control are available from previous 
encounters, the control of performance must move to a higher 
conceptual level, in which performance is goal-controlled, and 
knowledge-based (knowledge is here taken in a rather restricted 
sense as possession of a conceptual, structural model). The level 
might more appropriately be called model-based. In this situ-
ation, tt"»e goal is explicitly formulated, based on an analysis of 
the environment and the overall aims of the person. Then a useful 
plan is developed - by selection, such that different plans are 
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considered and their effect tested against the goal, physically 
by trial and error, or conceptually by means of understanding of 
the functional properties of the environment and prediction of 
the effects of the plan considered. At this level of functional 
reasoning, the internal structure of the system is explicitly 
represented by a "mental model" that may take several different 
forms. 
It is clear that the basis for cognitive control is fundamentally 
different at these levels, and consequently so will be the 
mechanisms leading to task interference. At the level of skill-
based performance controlled by sensorimotor patterns, 
interference in the topographical characteristics will be 
important. In the performance at the skill- and rule-based 
level, interference in the actual sign-patterns will be important 
(verisimilitudes), as well as interference between similar action 
segences. Finally, in the knowledge-based domain, interference in 
the purpose/function/process/equipment mapping may be important, 
in addition to acts related to hypothesis testing during problem 
solving. Other kinds of error mechanisms may be relevant, but in 
the present it will context be particularly important to simulate 
the psychological mechanisms leading to systematic, causally 
activated errors. 
It is important to note that the levels function as a 
hierarchical control system. Behaviour is composed of sequences 
of skill-based subroutines, which roll off as integrated smooth 
units without conscious control of the chaining of the individual 
acts when activated by the proper intention to act, no choices 
are to be made. At the rule-based level, skill subroutines are 
chained by choosing those suitable for the occasion according to 
know-how or prior experience. If a problem is at hand and no 
useful task sequence is available, knowledge-based "experiments'* 
on a mental model may be necessary to predict outcome and compare 
with relevant goals in order to generate a plan. 
The structure of this cognitive control necessitates the develop-
ment of the simulation model "bottom-up", by first considering 
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first the elementary skilled routines, and the basic error 
mechanisms of the skill-based control. Compared with Reason's 
GEMS approach, (Reason 1985) such skilled routines are activated 
as integrated task sequences by an intention or choice, and will 
be the elements of the task data base. More complex task 
sequences controlled at the rule-based level are composed of such 
routines, which are individually activated by a cue set including 
observation of indicators and the result of the antecedent act. 
The basis of the simulation model will be the data base in the 
form of a decision table including the individual skilled 
routines, with the cue sets for activation as entries. The 
simulation of error mechanisms will be a perturbation function 
representing the systematic mechanisms behind errors. In the next 
paragraph, the perturbations necessary to simulate the error 
categories considered in the error taxonomy (Figure 5) will be 
discussed. Examples of operator errors illustrating the 
categories used are given in Appendix 2. 
MODSLLXMO OPERATOR 1RROR8 
The perturbation functions to be included in the simulation model 
will be derived from consideration of the error mechanisms at the 
various cognitive levels. The model should be made by considering 
first correct performance of the frequent routine tasks, bottom-
up in the skill-rule-knowledge model; 
Skill-Based Level 
At the skill-based level, the operator is assumed to be com-
pletely adapted to the spatial and temporal characteristics of 
the interface. This means that instruments and keys are selected 
as intended. Then aberrations are introduced systematically in 
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errors (the classification labels of the taxonomy described by 
Rasmussen et al. (1981), are given in brackets). For each error 
mode, the heuristic rules to consider in order to delimit the 
need for combinatorially complete search during possible error 
modes will be indicated: 
Stereotype (skill) fixation. (Sl-1). This category represents 
the release of a familiar and normally very efficient work 
routine under inappropriate conditions. Ideally, the cue set for 
the task which is the simulated target for potential interference 
should be formulated and compared with the cue sets of all 
frequent activities, so as to identify potential for release of 
inappropiate tasks. 
This is not possible, partly due to the high number of 
activities, partly due to the informal and holistic nature of the 
initiating cues at the skill-based level. Working backwards may 
be more realistic: The acts which may be sources of interference 
during a particular transient are identified by backward search 
(cause seeking) for sources of unacceptable acts on vital equip-
ment. The frequent familiar tasks which include these acts as 
elements are identified by analysis of the action lists of 
procedures or interviews with skilled personnel, and the 
releasing cue set identified. Next, the cue sets of the accident 
scenario are scanned , to identify "close matches" which may 
release the unacceptable acts. 
Heuristic: For the safety equipment in service during the 
transient, identify those work routines in the data base which 
involve these items or topographically close items. Match the 
related activating cue sets to the cue patterns present, and 
select those of near-match to activate as interference tasks. 
Stereotype take-over (Sl-3). Represents the situation when a task 
routine is properly activated, but another, typically more 
frequent, routine has overlapping subsequences, and takes over 
(capture error). Simulation involves a search for similarities 
between subsequences of tasks properly activated during the 
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transient, and other members of the task repertoire which may 
"capture control". 
Heuristics; The task activated is compared with the other 
sequences in the task repertoire. Matching subroutine sequences 
are recorded and ranked according to size of overlap, and to 
frequency of occurrence. To limit the interfering tasks to 
consider, screening for lack of affinity of capturing tasks to 
safety equipment can be used (as above). Criteria for capture 
likelihood depending on frequencies and size of overlap should be 
found (preferably from operator metacognitive judgments?). 
Motor variability (S5-1). This mode represents the lack of 
precision in manual tasks, and use of inappropriate force, etc. 
A probability distribution for the spatial precision as an over-
lay on the physical form of the interface will be able to 
generate errors of this category. The search will be extensive, 
unless it is limited to include only actions on keys which 
should not be operated, i.e., by looking only for highly familiar 
actions spatially close to critical items. Inappropriate force 
will not introduce new consequences (is covered by component 
fault). 
Heuristics; For critical keys or items in the safety equipment in 
operation, scan the task data base to identify operation on items 
in the topographic vicinity. Likelihood is graded by distance. 
Inadequate spatial orientation (S5-2) represents the cases when 
operators lose their orientation while moving around, and operate 
on equipment at a wrong location. This depends on similarities 
in spatial arrangements and appearance and will not be covered by 
the simulation because the underlying configurative information 
will not be available. The effects will be partially covered by 
the "mistake of alternatives" at the rule-based level. 
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»ule-Based Level 
At the rule-based level, the normal, successful performance vill 
be in terms of a "production system" which represents the 
procedural rules activated by cues derived from the defining 
attributes. The model will be a logical complete version of the 
Brunswickian lens, i.e., "naturalist guide", implemented in a 
decision table, which reflects only the control requirements of 
the system. Actual human performance will depend on convenient 
signs, rather than defining cues. 
An important consideration in the modelling effort vill be to 
investigate the possibility of systematically generating the 
likely set of convenient sign developed by skilled operators. The 
basis for such sign identification will be an application of some 
basic psychological principles controlling human adaptation. 
Several studies (e.g., Bruner, 1969; Rasmussen et al., 1974) 
indicate that skilled individuals adapt to strategies reflecting 
preference for "the way of least resistance", minimizing 
cognitive strain and load on short-term memory. From such general 
principles, very specific tactical rules can be derived, which 
will be efficient guides in the heuristic delimitation of the 
necessary variations of cue perturbations to include in the 
simulation model. Another basic principle will be that human 
memory is based on generative mechanisms, not rote memory and, 
therefore, items not integrated in a meaningful whole are likely 
to be forgotten. 
In the following paragraphs, heuristics for generating the 
perturbation functions will be discussed with reference to the 
rule-based error modes. 
Familiar association short-cut (Sl-2). This error mode represents 
the tendency of humans to identify very effectively correlation 
between the requirement for a certain act and a small set of 
convenient cues which may be completely informal (relay and motor 
noise, certain easily read instruments, etc.) and not intended 
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for that purpose. In a modern control room, cues are most likely 
to be associated with instrument readings, and, therefore, to a 
first approximation the "sign" adopted can be expected to be a 
sub set of the instrument indications which form the designed 
state defining set. When this subset is no longer valid as an 
activating cue, because the system condition has changed, a wrong 
task is activated. If, for instance, the cues normally activating 
a routine task are a subset of the cues related to an emergency 
procedure, there is a risk that the routine task will be 
inappropriately performed during an emergency, in particular 
during early phases when an emergency is not yet perceived by th 
operators. 
The perturbation function used to represent this error mode will 
have to scan the available cue set systematically during the 
situation considered in search for a match with the cue (sub)set 
related to the task repertoire. In order to avoid the 
combinatorial explosion in this search, an effective set of 
heuristics representing the operators' tactics in reading 
instruments should be applied. It should, however, be remembered 
that it is not a reliable model of human behavior that is needed, 
but a model describing a well defined envelope within which the 
systematic mistakes which are designed, trained, or instructed 
into the system will be found. 
Different heuristics for limiting the search can be proposed from 
more basic adaptive properties: 
Humans are economic and seek the way of least effort. Therefore, 
it can be expected that no more cues will be used than are 
necessary for discrimination among the tasks belonging to certain 
scenarios or situations which can be expected to guide "process 
feel", i.e., operator expectations. A crude representation can 
probably be made by defining "operation modes", or situations -
analogous to Minsky's frames - which will be labels for a related 
set of tasks that are then more likely activated than tasks 
outside the set. The formation of economic, convenient cue sets 
would then only have to be discriminative within the particular 
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set. When situations change, reliance on the cue sub-set which is 
no longer valid, will cause interference due to inappropriate 
"expectations". 
The concept of "process feel" or internal model is compatible 
with the basis of the lens model (compare with arguments of 
Tolman and Brunswick mentioned above): Operators are not 
accepting "input" or responding to stimuli, they are actively 
asking the question to the system which will be necessary to 
direct or confirm their expectations. 
This implies a systematic way of identifying the cue subset which 
operators will adopt. Sets of tasks which are related to the same 
work scenarios or plant operating modes are selected from the 
task repertoire, and the cue sets which are necessary and 
sufficient for task discrimination within the scenario are 
identified. These sets will represent the convenient signs 
related to the tasks. The same task will be related to different 
scenarios, and, therefore, several cue sets may be related to the 
task, probably with a primary joint set and some additional 
qualifiers. An analysis of the total cue set and the assumption 
of mental economy will lead to hypotheses about the most likely 
scanning sequence of the cue set for a given scenario, such as 
scanning according to the most salient cues of tasks considered 
in descending order of frequency of occurrence, or scanning in 
the order of most discriminative effect. 
The proper hypothesis to choose (perhaps several scanning 
principles should be included to get a reliable "envelope") can 
be decided by interrogating operators, since the information 
needed seems to be accessible by Reason's metacognitive judgment 
techniques. The work scenarios or operating modes to consider 
should be identified from work schedules, operation logs, and 
operator interviews. Comments to the present approach from social 
judgment research which is the origin of the lens model (Brehmer, 
1985, private communication) have implied that it should be 
considered, when comparing with results from the classical 
experimental use of the lens model, that the focus of those 
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subjects is normally given by the experimental condition. This is 
not the case in control room emergency situations. However, the 
definition of operating modes, and the effect of the operator's 
process feel may add up to similar conditions. 
Another guide for the scanning strategy can be derived from the 
striving for pattern for matching and the principle of "the point 
of no return". When information is observed sequentially, 
evidence (Rasmussen et al., 1974) seems to show a strong tendency 
to make a decision to act as soon as information is pointing to a 
familiar routine. Even when subsequent observations indicate that 
the routine will be inefficient, the decision will not be 
reconsidered. This points to a search for interfering tasks by 
matching cue subsets of the emergency situation to the task 
repertoire in the order of cue observation. A task is then 
activated from a match between the most salient and frequently 
used cues, irrespective of mismatch in the remaining part of the 
set. 
Heuristics: The empirical rules applied to avoid the need for 
exhaustive search will be related to choice of the most likely 
scanning order of cue observation, and a match of cue subsets to 
subsets of the entry vector of the task data base. The activating 
cue for the task data base will be determined from an analysis of 
the set necessary for discrimination within "operating modes." 
Interrogation of operating staffs will be useful. 
Information not received/sought (S2.1). This category can be 
identified by a search similar to the previous one. Cues are 
systematically omitted from the set, and the match to an activity 
by the rest-set is evaluated. The category will probably include 
omission of observation of "normally redundant" cues, and will 
therefore, to a large degree, be covered by the category just 
mentioned. 
Misinterpretation of information (S2.2). Members of this category 
may be very difficult to identify, since misinterpretation will 
depend on subjective expectations. Some members may be found by 
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replacing cues by other cues obtained by "one-element-
substitution" , e.g., moving decimal points, replacing letters, 
etc. 
Heuristics: A useful rule for limiting the search to perform may 
be to look for similarities between a cue pattern related to an 
unfamiliar situation, and compare with the cue patterns of tasks 
which are normally performed in the particular operating mode and 
which may activate an expectation leading to misinterpretations. 
In a way this heuristic rule adds to the "familiar shortcut" 
mode, an erroneous match which is independent of the scanning 
order. 
Forgetting isolated acts (S3.1). All action sequences can be 
analyzed to identify isolated acts which are likely to be 
forgotten. In particular, it should be done when the same action 
sequence is used repeatedly, and an omission can lead to coupled 
errors. This error mode can only be included from an analysis of 
the content of the particular tasks that are included as targets 
for interference which, however, will be a limited number. The 
analysis will require technical insight, since it will depend on 
knowledge about the actual verbal labelling of the task (cf. 
Worf: "the name of the task affects behavior") and about the 
effect of omissions on the rest of the sequence. 
Mistake among alternatives (S3.2). All tasks are analyzed to see 
whether the cue or action sets have members for which immediate 
alternatives are available, such as numerical signs, numbers, 
directions, etc. A search procedure is then designed to scan this 
list when the task is activated. 
Other slips of memory (S3.3). Can be anything. Most effects are 
probably covered by categories of technical faults in the fault 
tree analysis, since systematic coupling to other events is 
unlikely (should be identified by the other categories, or they 
should be identified by " backward identification"). 
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Knowledge-Based Level 
At the knowledge-based level where control of behavior depends on 
problem solving based on operations on a mental model of the 
system to control, the variety of error modes which have to be 
identified and formulated for inclusion in the automatic scanning 
during simulation, will be much larger than in the skill- and 
rule-based levels. This is because the cognitive processes 
involved will be much more varied. In addition, the mental model 
available to the operators will not be formed and maintained in a 
uniform way by the daily work requirements, and therefore cannot 
be found by an analysis of the system requirements as it is the 
case for the task repertoire influencing the error modes at the 
rule-based level. 
Automatic control of a failure-mode-and-effect analysis at this 
level is at present considered less realistic. However, some 
categories of errors may be identified by searching for 
interference between mental models at different levels in the 
purpose/function/process/equipment hierarchy, in terms of 
compering means-ends relations of the same person or competing 
intentions of different persons. 
At present, it is considered an advantage to test the simulation 
model at the skill- and rule-based level before the model is 
complicated further by including functions at the knowledge-based 
level. If a situation appears during simulation when such 
performance is required because no match, or near-match, is found 
between the cue set present and the entry in the task repertoire, 
an interrupt to the experimenter may be made,as a first 
approximation and, in a way, simulating an operator requiring 
the advice of a supervisor. 
Comparison with Other Taxonomies 
During recent years, other taxonomies of human error and bias of 
judgment, based on the consideration of cognitive control 
mechanisms have been proposed, and a comparison between the error 
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categories will be useful. In this section, a mapping is 
considered of the human error and bias categories suggested by 
Reason and Embrey (1985) onto the simulation model: 
Error shaping factors at the skill-based levelfp.78) 
Recency and frequency of prior eraployment. "The more recently and 
frequently a particular routine is set into motion and achieves 
its desired outcome, the more likely it is to recur uninvited as 
a slip." This mode is equivalent to the stereotype (skill) 
fixation (Sl-1). 
Environmental control signals. "Familiar environments trigger 
associated action routines, particularly at moments of reduced 
intentionality. These erroneous actions obey local rules even 
though they are out of step with the current plan." This error 
mode is closely equivalent to the stereotype takeover mode(S1-3). 
Shared scheme features. "From the pattern of slips observed in 
everyday life, it is evident that the intentional activation of a 
given set of action schemata also has the effect of increasing 
the activation of other schemata possessing shared features." 
This is another way of presenting the stereotype-take-over 
failure mode (Sl-3). 
Concurrent plans. "Many slips betray the influence of concurrent 
plans or intentions. These can take the form of blends in which 
two active plans become intermingled in the same action 
sequence." To a first approximation this mode is also taken care 
of by the stereotype takeover mode of error (Sl-3). (In the 
present context, the simulation of the error mechanisms which are 
likely to give high likelihood couplings is the prime 
consideration.) 
Error shaping factors at the rule based level (p.80): 
Mind set (Einstellung). The fixation mechanisms described by 
Luchins and Luchins (1950), who experimentally demonstrated the 
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potential rigidity of rule-bound behavior. This error mode is 
directly equivalent to the "familiar short-cut" (Sl-2). 
Availability The error inducing effects of the availability bias 
have been demonstrated by Tversky and Hahnemann (1982). "Things 
that come more readily to mind are likely to be more frequent, 
more probable, more important, more useful, and better understood 
than less readily available items." This heuristic bias may be 
considered by putting recency or frequency weights the search 
function, together with the selection function related to cue-
subset matching. A fuzzy rule like "recently-used-in-this-
context" weight. Another fuzzy consideration may be "this task is 
normally following now", related to process feel. 
Matching or representativeness Bias. This bias is related to the 
fact that human judgment is based on prototypical features, 
rather than defining attributes, and is caused by matching a 
prominent feature of a situation to a stored situational 
representation also possessing that feature. This matching bias 
will also be well represented by the "familiar short-cut" mode. 
Over-simplification. "Studies in which people are asked to rate 
objects or other people on each of several specific dimensions 
reveal a striking inability to take account of the independent 
way in which these entities vary along the different dimensions. 
Instead, there seems to be an overwhelming tendency to collapse 
all these dimensions into a single ordering by merits or 'good 
versus bad' dimension thus losing valuable information about the 
pattern of attributes unique to a single object or individual." 
There seems to be no directly equivalent to this error mode in 
our taxonomy. However, the behavior tendency implied is the same 
as we have found in our highly skilled routines, and whether they 
constitute errors or a specific, effective (focussing) strategy, 
depends on the context. It may be argued that the heuristics is 
in particular used in knowledge-based control. 
Over-confidence. "Problem solvers have a marked tendency to be 
over-confident in evaluating the correctness of both their rule 
- 47 -
selections and their knowledge of the system." This formulation 
in fact indicates a relation to the knowledge-based domain, if 
not it is a manifestation of the 'familiar short cut' routine, 
i.e., confidence in inductive generalization. 
In conclusion, a structured mapping between the error categories 
of the various cognitively based taxonomies can be formulated 
and, therefore, the taxonomy proposed by Rasmussen et al. (1981) 
can be considered a suitable starting point for the development 
of a simulation model. 
Error Recovery 
Error recovery is a very important feature if probabilities of a 
particular scenario are to be estimated. Error recovery depends 
on some kind of error detection followed by corrective actions. 
Detection may be due to "the wrong key effect", i.e., the 
continuation of the intended task sequence is impossible, unless 
the error is corrected. This depends solely on features of the 
plant. Detection may be due to an operator realizing that a task 
has an effect in contrast to his expectations. This requires 
modelling of his expectations as is included in optimal control 
models by means of a Kalman filter representation of plant 
performance. It is, however, a question whether operator 
expectations about the response of dynamical, technical systems 
depend on a dynamical internal model of the entire plant to be 
controlled. This may be the case when operators are in a tight 
manual control mode, but in case of occasional control during 
disturbances, the "expectations" may depend on a more fragmentary 
internal model, composed by representations of dynamic entities 
at a higher functional abstraction level in terms of categories 
of prototypical "time-constants" of typical elements such as 
thermal systems and rotating systems , and only judged by, for 
instance, their physical sizes. 
Furthermore, it is a question to what extent the human detection 
function need to be represented. The "expectations" in fact 
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reflect system properties, the time instant when detection can 
occur is determined by the dynamical time delay in the system; 
whether it will occur depends on the preoccupation of the oper-
ator, which means that both branches (recovered and not re-
covered) should be represented in the risk analysis. The quality 
of an operator model will only affect probabilities. 
The "time-constant" itself of the system operated on will 
determine the time interval to the most likely error recovery by 
a skilled operator, and thus the time for considering branching 
in the event tree. An important aspect to consider at this point 
in time may be the possibility of another erroneous operator act 
at the time of error detection, if the cue pattern present 
matches (or nearly matches) an unacceptable action sequence. 
Again it should be remembered that only the systematical error 
modes causing extra couplings in system structure are to be 
considered. Therefore, features peculiar to a particular, 
individual performance related to unsystematic error recovery 
should not be included. 
THE RESULTING MODEL 
In summary, the structure of the model resulting from these 
considerations will be the following: 
The state of the system will be represented by a set of measured 
variables. From this set, a set of cues for operator actions is 
generated by means of a perturbation function representing the 
cue validity in the Brunswick lens or sensor reliability in the 
technical sense. During simulation, a control program will scan 
through the relevant perturbations. 
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The resulting cue set represents the observations available to 
the operator, and will be transformed by another perturbation 
function representing the Brunswickian cue utilization. A control 
program will have to scan through all relevant perturbations by 
heuristics derived from the error taxonomi discussed above. 
The cue set thus obtained will be the entry pattern for a 
decision table search for a matching task sequence, which will be 
retrieved from the task data base and, in turn, define the action 
sequence to be fed to the plant simulator. 
In addition, a search for match between action subsequences of 
the task retrieved and subsequences of other, typically more 
frequent, tasks should be performed. In case of a match, a 
switch-over to the similar task is simulated after the common 
subset. 
The structure of the model is very similar to the basic component 
model of DYLAM: The operator, as a component, is represented by a 
decision table associating cue sets to proper action sequences. 
Search through the relevant error modes is controlled by a set of 
perturbation functions controlled by heuristics derived from the 
available error taxonomies. In the DYLAM context, an attempt is 
made to represent the operator responses in terms of a fuzzy set 
model representing errors in terms of verisimilitude of 
membership functions of cues (Mancini, 1986). The mapping of the 
various error categories discussed in the previous section in 
terms of such membership functions will be useful for system 
development. 
In conclusion, a stepwise development of a model of operator 
responses to disturbances of plant operation based on the 
modified Brunswickian lens model appears to be a feasible 
approach. A pregram for testing the model should be planned. One 
approach for testing will be to use the well structured micro-
worlds of computer games, which offer a context in which the 
entire task repertoire can be formulated, and a consistent data 
collection as well as data analysis can be made. (Rasmussen, 
1985). Another possible test bed would be the GNP (Generic 
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Nuclear Power) experimental facility (see Goodstein 1983). In 
these experiments, the model should simulate a computer game 
player and an operator of a simulated GNP plant, and the 
performance (in particular the error modes) compared with 
recordings of human players, operators respectively. 
Finally, as a test could be used would be a comparison between 
the event trees that would be identified by the simulation model 
and those found by human analysts in a benchmark test of 
procedures for industrial risk analysis. 
CONCLUSION ANT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main conclusion of the review presented in the present report 
is that a plan can be formulated for a systematic development of 
a model suited for simulation of operators1 responses to 
disturbed process plant operation. A prerequisite for such a plan 
to be realistic will be a coordinated set of assumptions which 
take into consideration the special features of the design 
practice for potentially risky process plants, of the procedures 
for probabilistic risk analysis, and of the basic psychological 
mechanisms bringing structure to the error modes of skilled 
operators. 
Development of the model will depend on several lines of research 
dealing with separate topics. These should, however, be carefully 
coordinated to reach a useful result with a reasonable demand on 
research resources: 
A careful consideration of the requirements of the risk analysis 
which is to be supported by the model can identify feasible, 
simplifying assumptions with respect to the situations and tasks 
for which responses should be included. Several stages of the 
development can be envisaged. In the first approximation, the 
model will serve only to identify responses adding new branches 
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to the fault trees which have been identified from considering 
merely the technical component faults. In addition, 
simplifications can be made by looking for models creating an 
envelope known to include the relevant operator errors. The 
resulting error modes should then be screened for irrelevant 
modes by the risk analyst. The basic philosophy is that a well 
formulated boundary of the model will be more important than 
precise coverage. The model should then be refined gradually by 
more precise definition of the limits of coverage, together with 
consideration also of tasks which only contribute to the prob-
ability of already identified events. These aspects imply an 
analysis of the detailed requirements of the risk analysis that 
is to be supported by the model, and of the various possible, 
simplifying assumptions. 
Another major line of development will be the development of a 
systematic model of the task repertoire of the crew operating the 
actual process plant. The aim is the development of a tool which 
will serve to identify the interference between the different 
tasks which can lead to systematic coupling between otherwise 
independent events, i.e., common mode errors which are in a way 
unintentionally designed, trained, or instructed into the system. 
From this point of view, a systematic data base including 
characteristics of the total task repertoire appears to be as 
important for a risk analysis as is a data base including 
component characteristics and fault nodes. Three lines of 
development should be considered and tried out for this purpose: 
1. An extension of the existing task analyses, in particular 
with respect to identification of the observation cues which 
are used by the crew for control of the tasks. 
2. Considering that a model of a properly performed task is in 
fact a model of the control requirements of the process 
plant, the fundamental structure of a given task can be 
derived systematically from a representation) of the func-
tional properties of the plant. A program should be 
formulated to test how far this approach can serve the 
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development of a task model. A prerequisite will be a 
consitent representation of the functional properties of the 
plant in terms, for instance, of a means-ends hierarchy 
including causal relations as well as information on design 
intentions. This implies a separate data base development 
which, however, has also been identified as a basic need for 
the design of decision support systems in the plant control 
rooms. 
3. Finally, methods should be developed and tested, for the 
interrogation of operators, in order to get information 
about the actually used task sequences and, in particular, 
about the observation cues, the cue scanning tactics, and 
the frequency of the different tasks. For this purpose, 
methods for "expert knowledge acquisition" considered for 
design of expert systems, and methods for "metacognitive 
judgement" should be tested. 
In the first phase the aim will be to develop a model including 
the skill- and rule-based task performance. In a later phase, 
also the knowledge-based domain should be considered. The review 
of cognitive models available has identified several model ap-
proaches which can be the basis for this development. They will 
all need a representation of the operator's "mental model" in one 
form or the other and, to prepare for this extension, a program 
for the study of mental representations of physical systems will 
be needed, theoretically as well as experimentally. Such a study 
can advantageously be coordinated with the formulation of the 
means-ends hierarchy mentioned above which can serve as a 
framework for identification of the content (not the form) of 
the mental model. Related to this work will be the study of the 
benefit to be gained from use of fuzzy set and optimal control 
models for representation of mental processes and "process feel", 
respectively. This extension will be important in particular for 
a representation of error recovery features which will be 
necessary for a more refined model (i.e., a model with a narrower 
envelope around the relevant performance sequences), and which 
will open up for the practical development of the integrated 
models described in the review. 
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Finally, an important part of an integrated program will be a 
plan to test the model concepts. Different stages in such a test 
program can be proposed: 
1. Since the quality of the model depends entirely upon a 
representation of the entire task repertoire, it will be 
important to test the model concepts related to the error 
mechanisms separately in a task context for which a well 
bounded set of task sequences can be identified. For this 
purpose, a well chosen computer game appears to be suited, 
in particular because schemes for systematic data collection 
and analysis can be developed. For this purpose, the 
cognitive task characteristics of various games should be 
compared with the requirements of the process plant tasks, 
and an experimental program as sketched in Appendix 3 con-
sidered for the first test. 
2. Next, a test of the validity cf the task models developed by 
the approaches proposed above should be performed by a 
simulation of a simplified process system (as, for instance, 
the GNP system) in a laboratory environment where systematic 
methods for observation and data analysis can be used by 
trained experimental psychologists. 
3. Finally, when an acceptable task model is available, a full 
scale test should be made by a simulation together with the 
DYLAM system as a part of a bench mark test in which the 
simulated performance is compared with the event sequences 
as identified by a panel of expert risk analysts. From the 
structure of the model and of DYLAM, no conceptual problems 
are envisaged; however, only a set of algorithms will be 
needed for control of the perturbation functions of the 
present model in synchronism with the DYLAM. 
In all, a promising line of research can be entered, combining 
recent results from cognitive psychology, risk analysis, control 
theory, and process plant simulation. A successful program will, 
however, require a coordinated approach to all the elements of 
the problem concurrently by an interdisciplinary team. 
- 54 -
REFERENCES 
Amendola A., (1984). DYLAM-1 A Software Package for Event Seaence 
and Consequence Spectrum Methodology. EUR 9224 EN. Ispra: EEC-
Joint Research Center. 
Burgy, D. ,C.Lempges, A.Miller, L. Schroeder, and H. vanCott, 
(1983). Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Crews. 
Vol.1-4. NUREG/CR-3371, Washington DC: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
Bruner, J. S., J. J. Goodnow, and G. A. Austin. (1956). A Study 
of Thinking. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Brunswick, E. (1957). Scope and aspect of the cognitive problem, 
in: Contemporary Approaches to Cognition. H.E.Gruber et al. 
(Eds.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Cacciabue, P. C. (1986): System Response Analyser: A Tool for the 
Analysis of the Behaviour of systems. Tech. Note No. 
1.05.CI.86.12 PER 1100/86. Ispra: Joint Research Center. 
Goodstein, L. P., J. Hedegaard, K. See Højberg and M. Lind. 
(1983). The GNP Testbed for Operator Support Evaluation. Ros-
kilde, Denmark: Risø National Laboratory, Report No. M-2460. 
Hammond, K. R. (1966). The Psychology of Brunswik. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Lind, M. (1981). The use of flow models for automated plant 
diagnosis, in Human Detection and Diagnosis of System Failures. 
J. Rasmuseen and W. B. Rouse, eds. New York: Plenum Press, 422-
432. 
Lind, H. (1982). Multilevel Flow Modeling of Process Plant for 
Diagnosis and Control. International Meeting on Thermal 
Nuclear Reactor Safety, Chicago. (Also: Roskilde, Denmark: 
Ris National Laboratory, Report No. M-2357). 
- 55 -
Mancini, G. (1986): Modelling Humans and Machines. In: Hollnagel, 
E., Mancini, G., and Woods, D. (Eds.): Intelligent Decision Aids 
in Process Environments. Berlin: Springer VKII , in press. 
Miller, R.B. (1963). Task Description nd Analysis. In: R. M. 
Gagne (Ed.): Psychological Principles in System Development. 187-
228. Mew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Pedersen, O.M. (1985). Human Risk Contributions in Process 
Industry: Guides for Their Pre-Identification in Well-Structured 
Activities and for Post-Incident Analysis. Risø-M-2513, Roskilde: 
Risø National Laboratory. 
Rasmussen, J. (1980). What can be learned from human error 
reports, in Changes in Working Life. K. Duncan, M. Gruneberg, and 
D. Wallis, eds. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Rasmussen, J- (1982). Human factors in high risk technology. In: 
E.A.Green (Ed.). High Risk Safety Technology. Lodon: Wiley and 
Sons. 
Rasmussen, J. (1983). Skills, Rules, Knowledge; Signals, Signs, 
and Symbols; and Other Distinctions in Human Performance Models. 
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Vol. SMC-13, 
No. 3. 
Rasmussen, J. (1984). Human Error Data. Facts or Fiction? 4th 
Nordic Accident Seminar. Rovaniemi, Finland. Risø-M-2499. 
Rasmussen, J. (1985): Use of Computer Games to Test Experimental 
Techniques and Cognitive Models, Third Symposium on Empirical 
Foundation of Information and Software Science, Risø, Roskilde, 
October 1985. To be Published. 
Rasmussen, J. (1986). On Information Processing and Human-Machine 
Interaction: An Approach to Cognitive Engineering. New York: 
Elsevier Scientific Publishers. 
- 56 -
Rasmussen, J., and A. Jensen. (1974). Mental procedures in real 
life tasks: A case study of electronic trouble shooting. 
Ergonomics. 17, (3), 293-307. 
Rasmussen, J., O. M. Pedersen, A. Mancini, A. Carnino, M. 
Griffon, and P. Gagnolet. (1981). Classification System for 
Reporting Events Involving Human Malfunction. Roskilde, Denmark: 
Risø National Laboratory, Report No. M-2240. 
Rasmussen,J., Pedersen O.M. (1984): Human Factors in 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis and in Risk Management. In: 
Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants. Vol.1, I.A.E.A., 
Vienna. 
Reason, J. (1982).Absent-Minded? Prentice- Hall. 
Reason, J. (1985a). General Error Modelling System (GEMS). In: 
Rasmussen, Duncan and Leplat (Eds.): New Technology and Human 
Error. Proceedings of 1st Workshop on New Technology and Work. 
Bad Homburg. John Wiley. To be published. 
Reason, J. (1985b). Simillarity-Matching. Frequency-Gambling. 
Inference, and Metaknowledge: Their Relative Contributions in 
Different Memory Search Tasks. (Working title). In preparation. 
Reason, J.T. and Embrey, D.E. (1985). Human Factors Principle 
Relevant to the Modelling of Human Errors in Abnormal Conditions 
of Nuclear and Major Hazards Installations. Technical Report. 
Dalton, UK: Human Reliability Associates Ltd. 
Reina, G. and A.Amendola, (1981). DYLAM: A Computer Code for 
Event Sequences and Consequence Spectrum Analysis. Int. ANS/ENS 
Top. Meeting on Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Sept. 20-24, 1981, 
Port Chester N.Y. 
Tolman, E. and E Brunswik (1935). The Causal Structure of The 
Environment. Psychol. Rev., 42, 43-77. 
I St - 5 7 -
APPENDIX 1 
COGNITIVE MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Jens Rasmussen 
Edited extract from Jens Rasmussen: On Information Processing and 
Human Machine Interaction: An Approach to Cognitive Engineering, 
Elsevier Scientific Publishers (in press) 
- 59 -
APPENDIX 1 
REVIEW OF COGNITIVE MODELS 
The skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based framework is useful to 
structure a description and discussion of various domains of 
human behavior and to distinguish among them. Because the control 
mechanisms of the different categories, as well as the 
interpretation of information from the environment, are basically 
different, it is likely that different types of models are 
suitable for quantitative prediction in the various domains. 
Analytical models can be very important in the design of human-
machine systems for optimizing task performance, in particular, 
for rare event scenarios which are to be considered for design in 
centralized, high risk installations and for which system 
performance cannot be verified experimentally* A problem one has 
to face in such situations is that modeling of the interaction of 
categories of behavior is very important, and this requires 
compatibility among the separate kinds of models. It is not 
intended here to go into detail on the various models, but 
instead to review their main characteristics in order to select a 
model for the present specific purpose. 
The natural starting point of this discussion is a review of the 
approaches toward the modeling of the subconscious, skilled 
interaction with the physical environment. Behaviour in this 
domain has some characteristics that determine the nature of 
useful models. Behaviour is not controlled by a set of process 
rules, but by a dynamic, internal model of the environment which 
controls the sensorimotor interaction by means of signal 
processing in the space-time domain. Because skilled performance 

































Figure 1. Simplified map of three levels of control of 
human actions. The three levels are in a real situation 
interacting in a much more complex way than shown; Note that 
the arrows indicate information flow, not necessarily con-
trol. For instance, only the lowest level can be considered 
"data-driven". For the higher levels, information is active-
ly sampled ("rule"- or "model-driven"). However, two aspects 
are necessary in explaining human behaviour: Reasons in 
terms of intentions, conditioning the organism top-down, and 
causes in Jtferms of sensory information releasing actions 
bottom-up in the figure. 
. (Reproduced from Rasmussen (1983) with permission from 
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performance in this domain will generally be models of features 
of the environment as viewed through human selectivity and 
limitations. If models should also include the quantitative 
precision necessary in control of manual acts, sets of 
mathematical time functions seem to be the only reasonable 
choice. Models in this category have been discussed in detail by 
Sheridan and Ferrell (1974). Two aspects of skilled behavior are 
to be considered, and have typically been considered separately, 
in modeling. One is the control of human attention allocation, 
the other aspect is the control of the manual interaction. 
Attention Allocation 
Humans do not constantly scan the environment and extract 
meaningful features from the available flux of information. 
Acting in a familiar environment, people sample the environment, 
controlled by their expectations as to where an update of their 
internal dynamic world model is needed. This means that this 
model specifies when an update is needed, and where to look. 
Different approaches to model this function have been tested 
experimentally. 
One family of models is based on queueing theory. The system 
considered in queueing theory is a person serving a number of 
tasks. The tasks cannot be attended simultaneously, but have to 
be considered on a time-sharing basis according to a service 
strategy depending on the nature of the tasks. Many task demands, 
such as instrument reading during a monitoring task, arrive 
randomly. Typically, queueing theory considers demands with 
poison or exponential distributions. Queueing models of attention 
allocation postulate that humans optimize their performance 
according to a service strategy considering the arrival sequence 
and task priority. Queueing theoretic models have been used by 
Carbonell (1966) and Carbonell et al. (1968) for a study of 
instrument scanning behavior of aircraft pilots in order to 
predict the fraction of time devoted to each instrument. Also, 
Senders and Posner (1976) have developed a queueing model for 
monitoring tasks. Rouse (1977} has employed queueing theory to 
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model pilot decision making in a multitask flight management 
task. Queueing models basically represent the time distribution 
and priority characteristics of the task environment and can 
therefore be useful for analysis of the workload posed in terms 
of time and scanning requirements in a monitoring task. 
Another approach in the frequency domain is based on Nyquist's 
information sampling theorem which states that the information 
from a source having spectral components with an upper limit 
frequency of w Hertz can be completely represented by an observer 
who samples 2w times per second. The sampling model has been 
tested by Senders (1964) in experiments where the subjects' task 
was to respond to a number of instruments fed by random signals 
of different bandwidth. Also data from pilots in real flight 
tasks seem to match the model (Senders, 1966). These findings 
support the statement that highly trained operators in fact 
mirror the properties of the environment as long as performance 
is well within capacity limits. 
Detection 
The ability of humans to detect changes in the behavior of a 
system that they are monitoring is important for systems control, 
in the present application in particular for the ability to 
detect the occurrence of own acts which were not as intended. 
Different approaches to predictive, quantitative models of 
detection have been taken. 
A classic approach is based on the signal detection theory that 
was developed from studies of problems in statistical analysis of 
detection of radar signals in noise (Wald, 1947). A review of 
later developments can be found in Sheridan and Ferrell (1974). 
An extensive number of experiments have been made with subjects 
detecting visual or auditory signals in a background of noise. 
Given probability distributions of noise and signal plus noise, 
signal detection theory can lead to prediction of the probability 
of misses and false alarms in a detection task. The theory has, 
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however, had more application in experimental psychophysics than 
in systems design. 
Detection of changes in system behavior from signals, rather than 
appearance of signals in noise, has been modeled by estimation 
theory. This is a control theoretic approach based on parameter 
estimation in a state space representation. Models based on 
estimation theory represent human detectors as ideal observers 
monitoring dynamic processes. Gai and Curry (1976a) have proposed 
such a model which assumes that the human observer can be 
represented by an optimal Kalman filter which serves to eliminate 
perceptual noise and to predict the state of the system 
monitored. Detection is, then, based on the Kalman filter 
residuals, i.e., the difference between the observers' 
expectations regarding the states and the actually observed 
states. In this type of detection model, only visual input 
information is considered, i.e., the system is an open loop. It 
has been suggested, partly based on Young's (1969) experiments, 
that feedback from the hand movement of a closed-loop human 
controller will improve failure detection (Curry and Ephrath, 
1976). Subsequent experiments tend to indicate that the influence 
on detection of closed-loop control depends on circumstances. A 
series of experiments made by Wickens and Kessel (1981) confirm 
the hypothesis of improved closed-loop detection, whereas Ephrath 
and Young (1981) report ambiguous results possibly depending on 
the level of workload in the task. Another explanation may be 
that perception and motor schema generation have different 
characteristics and limit properties in their functions of 
dynamic world modeling. Probably, comparative experiments with 
detection in open-loop monitoring and closed-loop control could 
be used to separate aspects of these functions. 
The attention allocation and detection functions basically depend 
on signal processing. The information considered is the 
quantitative state of signal patterns related to spatially 
distributed sources with reference to their stochastic nature. 
For these functions, the functional meaning with respect to 
selection of proper action is not considered. This interpretation 
is represented separately in judgment- or decision-making models. 
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Manual Control Models 
Models of human performance In closed-loop control tasks have 
been very Important for representation of the properties and 
limitations of humans in vehicle control, in particular in 
aviation, and a separate school of modeling based on control 
theoretic tools has developed. 
A review of models of human sensorimotor performance has been 
given by Pew (1974) . Such models have been developed, in 
particular, from laboratory tracking tasks, and will typically 
give information on signal-to-noise ratio, maximum bandwidth when 
tracking unpredictable wave forms, prediction capabilities in 
sine-wave tracking, etc. The role of predictive feed-forward 
control for an industrial control task has been demonstrated 
experimentally by Crossman and Cooke (1962). For design and 
evaluation of the control system for, e.g., aircraft, models 
based on continuous linear differential equations are important, 
because they are suitable for computer simulation of the total 
system performance. A review of such models can be found in 
Sheridan and Ferrell, (1974). 
The most recent development of such models has led to the optimal 
control models which are based on the observation of Leonard 
(1960) and Roig (1962) that the mean-square error from human 
tracking data approximated the mean-square error of various 
optimal controllers. Optimal control models have in particular 
been developed by Baron and Kleinman (1969) and used for 
describing pilot performance (Kleinman et al.1971). This model is 
based on the assumption that a well-trained, well-motivated human 
operator will act in a near-optimal way subject to certain 
internal constraints which limit his behavior. The internal 
dynamic world model necessary to account for human anticipation 
is represented by a Kalman-Bucy optimal filter. The model also 
includes observation noise and time delays depending on the 
instrument scanning strategy. The criterion is typically used to 
minimize square deviations from desired output as well as squared 
control effort according to a chosen trade-off ratio. 
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Figure 2 • A typical optimal control model of a human 
-vehicle controller. (From Kleinman, Baron, and Levison 
(1971) with permission from I.E.E.E.). 
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The model has been developed beyond the simple man-in-a-servoloop 
case, in that higher-level sequential functions for parameter and 
criterion control have been added in order to include 
multivariable control, monitoring, and decision making. This 
effort has proved successful for flight control and landing 
approach planning (Muralidhara.n and Baron, 1980; Baron et al., 
1981). Efforts have also been made to extend this model to 
process control, and recently (Baron et al., 1982), a simulation 
model based on control theory has been proposed for simulation of 
the dynamic performance of a nuclear power plant including the 
operating staff. One important aspect of this approach is that 
human behavior at all three levels (skill-, rule-, and knowledge-
based) as well as their interactions are considered in one 
integral model. It appears, however, at present to be difficult 
to collect the explicit human performance data that are needed 
for implementation of the model. 
This kind of integrated model has great importance for design of 
aviation and other vehicle systems because the decision and 
manual control tasks of the operator form one integrated task in 
direct coupling with system dynamics. The task of a pilot or 
driver is a direct space-time control of a moving physical 
object, the vehicle. The sensorimotor level of the human 
information processing in this task serves for control signal 
processing; i.e., the output manual actions are continuous 
signals in the semiotic sense. 
For process plants of the present levels of automation the 
continuous control signal processing is, however, automated. This 
means that human output actions will typically be related to 
switching and valving, and will be interpreted as stereotyped 
signs by the plant systems. This means that the human 
sensorimotor behavior will largely be occupied used for an 
interface manipulation skill. For this, the time-space 
characteristics wil.1. have no direct relation to the basic system 
dynamics or the supervisory control tasks for which they in a way 
act as separating interface. For such systems, the interface 
manipulation skill is probably most conveniently described 
separately with reference to the parametric description in terms 
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of the gain-bandwidth-accuracy mentioned above. In particular, 
the state identification can only be represented in terms of a 
Kalman observer when the dynamic properties of the system to be 
controlled are known in terms of the parameters of control 
theoretic state space description. This is only the case for 
well-structured systems as, for instance, aircraft and space 
vehicles, and to some extent, the internal thermodynamic 
processes of industrial plants, and not for object manipulation 
in the physical environment in general. In consequence, models 
based on optimal control theory are only suited to represent the 
state identification of sensorimotor behavior, and the feature 
formation necessary to release and modify skilled patterns in 
case of manual control of well-structured dynamic systems, from 
which information is interpreted as signals. In less-structured 
situations when feature formation and state identification are 
based on recognition of information interpreted as signs, models 
of human judgment in terms of statistical representations are 
more suitable. 
Models of Human Judgment 
State identification and recognition based on a pattern of cues 
or signs are typical front-end functions involved in the behavior 
at the rule-based level. Patterns of information from the 
environment - or the internal representation of the problem space 
- are interpreted as signs referring to manual acts or 
information processes. The process is not based on functional or 
symbolic reasoning, and the association from sign to response may 
be based on purely empirical evidence from prior trials or 
learned from a teacher. The person will typically not be able to 
identify the information from the environment acting as cues for 
his decisions, and very probably conscious introspection may only 
lead to invalid after-rationalization, because the basis of 
introspection is a process of a higher cognitive domain than 
involved in the rule-based behavior itself. 
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Models of judgment and decision making in everyday professional 
life at the rule-based level have very important implications for 
all trades, in particular for education and training and for the 
design of supporting tools. Therefore, models of this process 
have been the topic of extensive research in the area called 
human decision making, judgment, or choice, depending upon the 
paradigm of the approach. Several different approaches can be 
identified in this modeling effort, ranging from purely normative 
models based on economic concepts to predictive models derived 
from psychologic research. (For a detailed review see Hammond et 
al. (1980). 
Decision Theory 
This model is a mathematical model based on the expected utility 
theory developed by economists (Morgenstern) and mathematicians 
(von Neumann). The theory can be traced back to Bernoulli work 
on the worth of a decision determined by the probability of 
events and their associated utilities. Decision theory limits its 
interest to the single-system case, which involves one person 
without full knowledge of the task situation and without feedback 
about the effect of the decision. The approach focuses on 
decision making from a prescriptive point of view only. It is a 
logical structure for decisions and makes no claim that it 
represents or describes the information processing of human 
decision makers. The emphasis is not on what they do, but what 
they should do. Modern theorists (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) 
emphasize the mathematical modeling of subjective probability and 
utility and promote the use of the theory to aid decision makers 
to achieve logical consistency. 
Classical decision theory is, however, not useful as a model of 
human performance in real-life tasks, because it is a normative 
model. It will, therefore, not be considered in more detail in 
the present context. It may, however, be an important candidate 
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Figure 3. Different approaches to models of human decision 
and judgement and their relations to economical and psycho-
logical concepts. (Figures 44-46 have been adopted from 
Hammond et al. (1980) with permission from Hemisphere 
Publishing Corp. 
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Behavioral Decision Theory 
This theory was initially developed by Edwards and Tversky (1967) 
and is based on the Bayesian probability theory and on an 
experimental approach to modeling. The aim of the experiments has 
been to find out how closely human information processing 
approximates the Bayesian process, and how information is used to 
revise subjective probabilities. Experimental manipulations of 
the objective probabilities were used to examine revisions of the 
subjective probabilities. 
The approach intends to describe human departures from optimal 
performance empirically and to explain such departures in terms 
of both the external (task) and the internal (psychologic) 
conditions. An often-mentioned departure from optimal decision 
making is conservatism, which represents the failure of humans to 
revise their posterior subjective probability as much as they 
should upon the receipt of new information. People are 
'•conservative Bayesians". 
Behavioral decision theory and classic decision theory share the 
same basic concepts as decision, preference, subjective 
probability, and utility, and both refer to the cognitive process 
of continuing probability and utility as "aggregation". These 
concepts are inherited from economic theory and mathematics, not 
psychology. However, unlike classic decision theory, behavioral 
decision theory does not aim at a prescription of the decision 
process, but at a description of the actual deviations from the 
optimal process. As such, it has had a rather extensive use to 
describe deviation from rational behavior in experiments on 
diagnostic behavior, for instance, in electronic troubleshooting 
(Rigney et al., 1968). 
Psychologic Decision Theory 
In its recent form this theory ,s based on the work of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974, 1979) with their concepts of 
representativeness, availability, and the use of heuristics. 
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Their approach rejects the use of optimal decisions as frame of 
reference for description. It turns instead to a search for the 
psychologic mechanisms that people use to evaluate frequencies 
and likelihoods. Psychological decision theorists generally 
consider subjective utility theory to be empirically unsuccessful 
and to be replaced by a theory that explains human behavior, that 
not only explains why, but is also able to predict when people 
replace the laws of statistics by heuristics. The theory is still 
rooted in decision theory, using probabilities and utilities as 
central descriptive forms, but focuses on the way in which people 
assign probabilities to events on explicit formulation of the 
biases, and upon classification of means for supporting decisions 
by debiasing because it appears that simply warning people 
against their bias often proves ineffective). 
Tversky and Kahneman have identified a nusaber of biasing 
heuristics which are relevant also for the human-machine context 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Because the basic role of the 
heuristics is "to reduce complex tasks to simpler judgmental 
operations" - they are relevant in many situations during 
disturbed plant operation. 
The heuristics and their most important biasing effects are as 
follow: 
* Representativeness. People associate to a prototyped 
number of a class, neglecting prior probabilities and base 
rate frequencies as well as the effect of sample sizes, 
and are influenced by the illusion of validity as well as 
by the misconception of regression toward the mean. 
* Availability. People assess the frequency of a class or 
the probability of an event by the ease with which 
instances of their occurrence could be brought to mind. 
They are typically influereed by bias owing to easy 
retrieval of familiar and recent events, and by bias owing 
to the effectiveness of a search set and the imaginability 
of situations, independent of probability. 
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* Adjustment and anchoring. People make estimates an initial 
value which may be suggested by the formulation of a 
problem and which is generally not adequately adjusted. 
The heuristics and bias must be viewed as characteristics of the 
cognitive process, not as the effects of emotional or 
motivational behavioral factors (as, e.g., wishful thinking). 
"The main cause for the failure to develop valid statistical 
intuitions i3 that events are normally not coded in terms of all 
the factors that are crucial to the learning of statistical 
rules" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), i.e., they operate from 
convenient signs, not defining attributes, as it is discussed 
below in considering errors of "familiar association shortcuts". 
floelal Judgment Theory 
This theoretical development as well as the basic concepts of 
"ecological validity of cues" and "utilization of cues" originate 
in the Brunswik's theory of perception. The primary intention of 
the approach is not to explain, but to describe human judgment 
processes, and to provide guides for the development of decision 
aids. Central to the development has been the work of Hammond, 
Brehmer, and others (see Hammond et al., 1980). The basic 
framework of the theory is Brunswik's "lens model" (see Figures 
4&5). Central to the model, as shown in Figures 4&5, is that the 
environment and the person described symmetrical terms, hence, 
the name "lens model". The cues of the task vary in "ecological 
validity" and the person has a variation in "cue utilization", 
both of which may assume various linear and nonlinear forms. Both 
sides are analyzed and attempts are made to match ecological 
validities to cue utilization, as well as ecological function 
forms to subjective function forms, i.e., to identify the extent 
to which the principles of organization that control the task 
system are reflected in the principles of the organization that 
control the cognitive system of the person. The model, therefore, 
appear to be well suited as a basis for representing the effects 
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Figure 4 . Decision theories consider the cognitive system and 
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Figure 5. Brunswik's "Lens Model". 
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The "lens model" has been the basis of research concerning 
diagnostic judgments in several professional activities such as, 
for instance, stockbrokers, clinical psychologists and physicians 
(Brehmer, 1981). A problem in such research is to describe a 
mental process of which the person is not himself aware. The 
approach has been to assume that even though the person is not 
aware of the process, he will know the information, i.e., the 
cues, on which the process is based. In experiments, therefore, 
cues identified as diagnostically relevant by expert judges are 
used to present, generally in written form, subjects with trial 
cases. From the experimental research then, the statistical model 
describing diagnostic behavior is identified. The general result 
has been that linear statistical models, such as multiple 
regression analysis, have been adequate. Four general results are 
typical of such diagnostic experiments. First, the judgment 
process tends to be very simple. Even though persons identify up 
to 10 cues to be relevant to diagnosis, they actually use very 
few, usually only two or three, and the process tends to be 
purely additive. Secondly, the process tends to be inconsistent. 
Subjects do not use the same rule from case to case, and judgment 
as a second presentation of a case may differ considerably from 
what it was the first time. Third, there are wide individual 
differences even among subjects with years of experience. They 
differ with respect to the cues used and the weights they apply. 
The fourth general result is that people are not very good at 
describing how they make judgments (Brehmer, 1981). 
Given that intuitive judgments of an expert are performed by 
processes below the level of conscious attention, one may wonder 
whether laboratory experiments based on formal cues identified 
consciously by professional experts (textbook cues?) real?.y 
correlate with the cues used in the real life situation in which 
cues depending upon prehistory and informal "situational cues" 
may play an important role. 
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Attribution Theory 
The basis of this theory is the theoretical work of Heider (1958) 
but has been developed by several researchers, for instance Kelly 
(1973), who has given several survey papers. The theory has been 
central within social psychology. The theory is very general in 
its aim and tends to cover not only a single person making 
judgment of the cause of an event in a social situation but also 
interpersonal relations in judgment, learning, and conflict. The 
central concept of the theory, "attribution", can be considered a 
special case of inference or judgment. Choice of action or 
preference for friends, for instance, follow from different 
attributions, but the theory is primarily concerned with 
inferences about causality, i.e., causal attributions, and should 
therefore probably be considered more in regard to human-machine 
systems than it presently is. 
Kelly (1973) considers two different cases. First, the attributor 
has information from several observations and is able to respond 
to covariation between the observed effect and its possible 
causes. Second, the attributor has information from only a single 
observation and must respond to the set of conditions present at 
a given time. Thus, it is necessary for him to take account of 
the configuration of factors that are plausible causes. By the 
covariation concept, an effect is attributed to one of its 
possible causes with which it covaries over time. Implicit in 
this principle is the problem of the exact temporal relations 
assumed to exist between a cause and i^s effect. 
Kelly and Heider conceptualize the attribution process in terms 
of the analysis of variance as employed by the psychologist to 
interpret experimental results. "The assumption is that the man 
in the street, the naive psychologist, uses a naive version of 
the method used in science" (Kelly, 1973, p. 109). In this 
analysis of variance, the salient possible causes constitute the 
independent variables and the effect constitutes the dependent 
variable. For a wide range of attribution problems, the classes 
of possible causes are as shown in Figure 6 : persons, 
entities, times. An important application of the persons x entity 
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Figure '< Causal schemas of attribution theory. 
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x time framework has to do with attribution validity. A response 
is known to be valid if (a) the response is distinctively 
associated with the stimulus, (b) there is consensus, other 
people have a similar response, and (c) the response is 
consistent over time. These criteria have been tested 
experimentally, and studies designed to test the idea that naive 
subjects treat information informally in a manner similar to the 
way statisticians treat it formally, have been supportive. 
Configuration concepts are the basis of causal inference on the 
basis of a single observation of the effect. A person is rarely 
acting in complete ignorance, in that ordinarily he has observed 
similar effects before and has some notions about possible 
relevant causes. Several statements can be made about the way 
attributors think: the discounting principle stating that a given 
cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other 
plausible causes are also present; the augmentation principle 
stating that if the external cause tends to inhibit or suppress 
the observed effect, the presence will increase the attribution 
of causes internal to the person observed, etc. The configuration 
concept has been implemented in a set of causal schemata related 
to compensatory causes, multiple necessary causes, and multiple 
sufficient causes, see Figure 6. Such causal schemata provide a 
person with means for making causal attributions given only 
limited information. 
People have repertoires of causal schematas enabling them to deal 
with causal problems, and prototyped features can be identified. 
A major task for attribution theory is to specify when a given 
schema is evoked. In this function also stereotypes can be found: 
tendencies to prefer simple, e.g., single-cause patterns. This 
tendency has also been identified by Duncker (1945). He notes 
that certain cause-and-effeet connections are intelligible to an 
attributor without evidence of covariation: a track resembles a 
foot of an animal; heavy things make loud noises, etc. Another 
simplification is that consequences will be linked directly to an 
actor rather than bsing viewed as a joint function of him and the 
situation. 
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As with other theories, systematic discrepancies between 
normative and intuitive inferences have been identified: subjects 
fail to extract all available information; they do not gain as 
much confidence from a series of events characterized by 
consistency as a probability model suggests they should, or they 
give too much weight to exceptions from general trends. A 
tendency to find causal explanations for variations that should 
be attributed to sampling variability is related to the bias from 
representativeness as discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
Attribution theory has, as mentioned, not been much considered in 
the context of human-machine systems but the results obtained 
should probably be considered, for instance, in relation to group 
decision and personnel management modeling and in relation to 
attribution of the cause of incident to personnel error. Finally, 
as control systems grow increasingly complex and functionally 
intransparent, the operator-control system relationship becomes 
•ore of an interpersonal relationship and, consequently, a 
social-psychologic approach such as attribution theory may be an 
appropriate point of view. 
Fumxv set Theory 
In the typical models of human judgment, the relationship between 
the criterion and the attributes as well as between the 
attributes is considered to be stochastic in nature. This means 
that the categories and attributes are considered to be well 
defined and describable by classic logic including the rule of 
exclusion of the mean; i.e., an attribute is present or not 
present, and a judgment is either true or not true with a certain 
probability. The uncertainty may be due to the fact that the 
underlying phenomena are stochastic by nature, but it may also be 
due to lack of knowledge on part of the observer, to choice of 
attributes that are convenient cues rather than defining 
attributes, or may be caused by discrete representation in verbal 
statements of states of affairs which are in reality overlapping 
and fuzzy. This had led to extensive efforts to develop models of 
fuzzy reasoning (Gaines, 1976) based on Zadeh's fuzzy set theory 
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(Zadeh, 1965). An extensive bibliography on applications can be 
found in Gaines and Kohout (1977). The idea is basically that 
membership of a category is defined by a continuous membership 
function varying in the interval o-l, for instance, the 
membership value of a temperature related to the category "hot" 
is a continuous function of measured temperature; the membership 
value of a man related to the class "tall" is a continuous 
function of his height around 180 cm. This means that the classic 
probability distributions are replaced by "possibility 
distributions". From the literature it seems that tvo different 
developments can be distinguished. One is the use of fuzzy sets 
in familiar many-valued logic; another is development of a fuzzy 
logic in which the truth values are themselves fuzzy sets. Doubts 
have been raised on the value of the latter approach (Haack, 
1979) and, in general, the value of fuzzy sets compared with more 
traditional approaches seems to be a bit obscure. 
Experimentally verified fuzzy models have typically been based on 
fuzzy sets that have been manipulated using nonfuzzy operations, 
which could have been handled by the traditional sum-of-weighted-
attribute decision models. King and Hamdani (1977) have studied a 
fuzzy set model of a simple manual control task. Using verbal 
protocols they identified the following human operator control 
algorithms: if the error is "positive medium" or "big", and if 
its rate of change is "negative, small" then the control input 
should be "negative medium". The control action to choose from 
their observations was then selected from the possible actions as 
the one having the highest composite membership value. The 
individual membership grades were then quantified heuristically 
so that the performance of the algorithm was optimized. 
Comparison with performance of an algorithm based on conventional 
control design for control of practical systems proved that the 
fuzzy approach yielded better performance. A model based on a 
fuzzy set representation of human cement kiln operators' 
heuristic control rules has been developed by Umbers and King 
(1980) and afterward implemented in z.n automatic control system. 
They found it possible to obtain a satisfactory control, but 
experienced difficulties in having operators explain their 
behavior to a degree that made it possible to reach an adequate 
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fussy »odel. The basic advantage of the fuzzy set approach seems 
to be its combatibility with ambiguous verbal statements. 
Fuzzy set theory has been used by Hunt and Rouse to model the 
diagnostic behavior in fault finding tasks (Hunt and Rouse, 1981, 
1983). They used a two-level model based on the distinction 
between symptomatic and topographical search during diagnostic 
tasks. The idea is that an expert will operate on the rule-based 
level by associating symptoms to proper repair acts as long as 
they find them useful. When this is no longer the case, they will 
turn to the knowledge-based topographical search based on the 
functional topology of the system. The definition of an expert 
then depends on the ability to realize when their expertise is no 
longer valid. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in 
relation to "Expert Systems" in the next section. 
Hunt et al.(1983) define some symptomatic and topographical 
search rules that are derived from interviews of repair staff and 
laboratory experiments. The problem attacked by fuzzy set theory 
is the question which rule to apply in a given situation. In 
order to apply the knowledge contained in the rules, an algorithm 
for selecting rules is needed. Experience gained through prior 
diagnosis experiments has led Hunt and Rouse to the conclusion 
that four factors appear to significantly affect the rule 
selection process. For a rule to be selected: (a) the rule must 
be recalled; (b) the rule must be applicable to the current 
situation; (e) the rule must have some expected usefulness; and 
(d) the rule must be simple. It is hypothesized that rules are 
chosen on the basis of these four attributes. In most realistic 
situations, it is not always easy to make unambiguous assessments 
of the usefulness of a given rule. Further, from a human problem-
solving point of view, recall and applicability are not simple 
either-or attributes. These attributes can, therefore, be 
considered to be fuzzy sets. In the model, the choice of the rule 
to apply in each instance is based on an evaluation of each of 
the available rules according to its membership value in the sets 
of recalled, applicable, useful and simple rules. The model has 
been tested experimentally, and the approach seems to be 
promising (Hunt and Rouse, 1982). An interesting feature of this 
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•odel aay be its potential for learning the membership functions 
by experience (Rouse and Hunt, 1981). 
Artificial Intelligence Models« Scripts and Plans* Expert Systems 
During the recent decades there has been an extensive effort to 
design "artificial intelligence" systems based on analysis of 
human information-processing strategies. Different points of view 
concerning the aims of this development have been expressed 
varying from design of intelligent machines that consider only 
human behavior as a source of design ideas, to the view that AI 
programs are to be taken as models of human performance (Pringle, 
1979). Taken with caution, i.e., viewing AI programs as one 
possible implementation of a cognitive model without necessarily 
an isomorphic relation between elementary processes of human and 
computer, the cognitive models of AI are at present the most 
promising approach to simulation of higher-level processes in 
system design. 
Development within artificial intelligence has different typical 
periods and approaches; see, for instance, the review by Dreyfus 
(1981). The early period was mainly based on the general, 
context-free problem solving abilities of humans; a typical 
example is the general problem solver program (GPS) by Newell et 
al. (1956). This approach is tightly related to human behavior in 
the knowledge-based domain and is based on a representation of 
the basic causal structure of a problem, and will be discussed in 
•ore detail below. After some years of optimism, however, the 
development turned more toward models based on an extensive 
representation of domain-specific, procedural knowledge and of 
commonsense reasoning (Schank and Abelson, 1977). This means that 
the focus has shifted toward models of human behavior at the 
rule-based level, and typical for this approach are the various 
"expert systems" (Feigenbaum, 1979; Hayes-Roth et al., 1983). The 
knowledge representation in such systems is based on the "rules 
of thumb" used by human experts. These rules are not principles 
of general reasoning, and long inference chains that develop from 
general rules used on structural representations are rarely used 
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by "expert systems". The basic deductions behind the rules of the 
real expert are not repeated; the systems have stored the 
symptom-based responses of an expert within a limited domain. 
Recently there has been some concern about the reliability of 
such expert systems (Barnett, 1982). The symptom-based rules are 
derived from experts' experience rather than being model-based. 
Therefore, they are usually very effective and produce correct 
behavior, but they also have the potential to produce 
inconsistent responses to unfamiliar information. "The rules are 
plausible and work a high percentage of the time, this is vhy the 
expert uses them. However, when they fail, the human expert will 
know enough to realize this fact and find out vhy. He retreats to 
a better grounded model (one based upon more general principles)" 
(Barnett, 1982). In other words, the typical expert system only 
models human behavior at the rule-based level and lacks the 
ability to retreat to knowledge-based problem solving - it is 
only able to interpret information as signs. Therefore, the 
systems fail abruptly when the environment changes and no longer 
conforms with the experience behind the rules. 
Problem Solving Models. Artificial Intelligence approaches 
Problem solving at the knowledge-based level is, even now, best 
represented by the results of the classical analysis of verbal 
protocols by Selz (1922), Duncker (1942), de Groot (1963), etc. 
It is also typical that the approach taken by Simon et al. for 
simulating knowledge-based problem solving by means of production 
systems (Shaw, Newell and Simon, 1956; Newell and Simon, 1972) is 
based on this research. Based on a representation of the problem 
in a well-formed problem space, i.e., a model of the basic 
structure of the problem, behavior is developed from a set of 
production rules which are general, context-independent inference 
rules. A major weakness of this approach has been the difficulty 
of representing the ability of humans only to consider promising 
lines of reference for further development. This intuitive 
ability to see "where the problem is" is explicitly excluded from 
de Groot's analysis of the verbal protocols, and is not present 
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in the production type models; see Dreyfus* comment on this issue 
(Dreyfus, 1972). 
Generally, AI models have severe limitations because of the 
difficulty in representing the intuition or context present in 
human thinking stemming from the "subconscious world model" - or 
as Dreyfus expresses it - because of the lack of a physical body 
(Dreyfus, 1972). Hovever, AI models are even then the best 
available tool for simulation of human information processing, 
and the development is important, not only for design of 
intelligent information-processing robots, but also for 
representing the human part in simulation of human-machine 
systems. 
Imtsqrated Modelling Approaches 
Recently, attempts have been made to develop integrated models 
which are suited for predicting operator responses to familiar as 
well as unfamiliar task requirements in complex real-life 
environments. Of special interest in the present context is the 
approach to models of supervisory control behaviour taken by 
Baron et al. (1982). 
The characteristic feature of this approach is the closed-loop 
continuous modelling of the immediate interaction, based on the 
optimal control paradigm. This is an extension of the classical 
approach to vehicle control, and it has been successfully tested 
in this context. The "rule-based" addition to the optimal control 
model is based on production rules: IF (SITUATION), THEN 
(ACTION); or IF (SITUATION), THEN (SITUATION). This information 
is collected from procedure manuals or interviews with operating 
staff. If more than one situation is doomed to be "true" at a 
given time, choice is based on representation of perceived 
consequences. Closed-loop continuous behaviour maintains their 
own time scale, discrete actions use input data for completion 
times. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM SOLVING MODELS 








































MANUAL CONTROL MODELS 
OPTIMAL CONTROL MODELS 
Figure 7. The various models of human behaviour are suitable for 
different functions of an overall model. An important problem is 
to model the interaction among the various domains of behaviour. 
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The fundamental operator functions included in the model are 
similar to the Ris| abstraction ladder: Monitoring, assessment 
(diagnosis), decision (choice of priority), implementation. 
Basic elements of the model are: 
Mathematical model of the plant environment: 
1. State-space representation of the process including 
automatic control and engineered safety features. 
2. A description of the potential disturbances (known and 
unknown). 
3. A description of the instrumentation and display 
information supplied to the crew. (Note: in this respect 
the DYLAM may have an advantage being component based, the 
physical variables measured on the individual components 
may not be available from the functional balance 
simulation by a state space model). The model may be based 
on "first principles" or empirical models, e.g., records 
of data snap-shots. 
The model of the human operator includes several functions: 
1. Display processor. This function represents the 
"conscious" observation behaviour. A "single channel" 
processor is assumed. Visual fixation is allocated a 
certain time, visual observation noise is added. Auditory 
messages are stored, and the event detector notified. 
Chosen according to priority. The selection of a 
particular source of information is governed by goal-
oriented processes, and will depend on the purpose for 
which information is being gathered. Much of the time the 
choice is supposed to be controlled by operating 
procedures, otherwise, a normative scanning strategy is 
assumed. 
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Information processor. Is based on algorithms for state 
estimation and prediction. Supplies "mental models" for 
fast-time predictions ("thought experiments") or 
evaluation of planned actions. The algorithm is similar to 
optimal Kalman filters. Can serve as event - detection 
based on residual between predicted and observed states. 
"Allows the mode:ing of all monitoring functions described 
by Kisner et al." is a stated claim. 
Situation assessor. Several levels of assessment or 
diagnosis are contemplated. Lowest level, check of 
symptoms against templates residing in procedures or 
memory. Higher levels could include more sophisticated 
algorithms. 
Response selector/formulator. Stored, formal procedures 
are triggered by the situation assessor. If not existing, 
informal procedures are formulated. How this is done is 
not settled: "They are included, partly in an attempt to 
model some knowledge-based behaviour, partly for modeling 
convenience". Decision making is required concerning the 
continuation and termination of activity, and selection 
among competing procedures. The choice is assumed to be 
rational and to be based on the computed "expected net 
gain". 
Response effector. Three types of action: control, 
observation and communication. Associated with each action 
is an action time. When a procedure is activated, an 
operator is "locked in" for a certain time, and neither 
display observation nor other procedures will be 
considered. Exceptions are interrupts from high priority 
auditory Information (alarms). 
Memory. Is viewed as a store-house of information. 
Limitations of short term memory are considered. 
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7. Goal formation. In previous applications, a "unitary" goal 
structure was included. "In the present application 
probably a more hierarchical goal structure is required. 
The structure of the model is, in fact, very similar to an 
integration of the various models described in the previous 
section, arranged in a hierarchical structure very similar to the 
skill-rule-knowledge framework. It appears doubtful, however, 
whether an attempt to build an integrated model will be 
worthwhile, until the information and data needed for the 
individual model domains, for instance the representation of the 
total task repertoire including the activating cue sets 
(templates) for a rule-based model, have been developed and 
tested. 
Another approach to an integrated operator simulation model has 
been taken in the context of the OYLAH simulation system aiming 
at a simulation of the total course of events during incidents 
and accidents in nuclear power plants (Aroendola, 1984). The line 
of development of a model simulating the cognitive processes of 
the operators (Mancini, 1986) leads to a structure similar to the 
above mentioned model proposed by Baron et al. (1982). 
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APPENDIX 2 
EXAMPLES OF THE HUMAN ERROR MODES OF THE TAXONOMY 
USED FOR THE SIMULATION MODEL 
SKILL-BASED LEVEL 
Motor variability: 
* Inadequate precision leads to shortcircuit of terminals with 
screw driver. 
* Inadequate precision in replacement of relay cover leads to 
short circuit of relay terminals. 
* Varying use of force in manipulating a bank of valves occasion-
ally leaves a valve leaking. • 
Topographic miaorientatlom 
* Failure in one of several pump trains in the basement leads to 
the decision in the control room to switch off the "north train"; 
however, during passage downstairs, an operator loses orientation 




* During normal operation of a process plant the power supply to 
the instrumentation is disrupted. Investigation reveals that the 
manual main circuit breaker in the power supply is in the off 
position. The conclusion was that a roving operator, in checking 
cooling towers and pumps, had inadvertently switched from a 
routine check round to the Friday afternoon shutdown check round 
and turned off the supply. The routes of the two checkrounds are 
the same, except that the opereator is supposed to pass by the 
door of the generator room on the routine check, but to enter and 
turn off the supply on the shutdown checks. Something en route 
has obviously conditioned him for shutdown checks (sunshine and 
daydreams?). The operator was not aware of his action, but did 
not reject the explanation. 
* An experimental plant shuts down automatically during normal 
operation because of inadvertent manual operation of a cooling 
system shutoff valve. The valve control switch is placed behind 
the operating console, and so is the switch of a floodlight 
system, used for special operations monitored through closed-
circuit television. The switches are neither similar nor closely 
positioned. The operator has to pass the valve switch on his way 
to the floodlight switch. In this case, the operator went behind 
the console to switch off the flood light, but operated the 
shutoff valves which caused plant shutdown through the interlock 
system. 
* During start-up of a process plant, the plant is automatically 
shut down during manual adjustment of a cooling system. During 
start-up the operator monitored the temperature of the primary 
cooling system and controlled it by switching off and on the 
secondary cooling pumps to avoid water condensation in the 
primary system owing to the cold cooling water. On this occasion, 
he observed the temperature to pass the low limit, signaling a 
demand to switch off the secondary pumps, while he was talking to 
a cooperator about another matter over the phone. He then 
switched off the primary pumps and the plant immediately shut 
down automatically. He did not recognize the cause immediately, 
- 97 -
but had to diagnose the situation from the warning signals. The 
control keys for the two sets of pumps are positioned far apart 
on the console. However, a special routine exists, during which 
the operator switches the primary pumps on and off to allow an 
operator in the basement to adjust pump valves after pump 
overhaul while they communicate by phone. Is the event caused by 
schema interference resulting from the phone call? 
RULE-BASED LEVEL 
Forgetting an Isolated Item; 
* "Jumpers" not removed from terminals after repair; 
* Switches not turned back to "operation" after instrument 
calibration; 
* Bypass valves not reopened after pump repair; 
* Cables not reconnected after instrument repair, etc. 
Incorrect Recall of Isolated Items: 
* Incorrect recall of numbers of valves and switches. 
* Incorrect recall of figures, such as calibration references, 
set points, instrument readings. 
Mistake among alternatives 
* Using positive correction factors instead of negative; 
* Using increasing, instead of decreasing signal in calibration. 
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* Disconnect pump A instead of B. 
stereotype fixation 
* An operator presses air out of a plastic bag containing dust in 
order to seal it, although he knows it contains radioactive 
material. He gets contamination in his face. 
* During a cleanup operation in a radioactive area, a vacuum 
cleaner fails. A foreman opens it for a possible rapid repair, 
despite the fact that he knows it contains radiosactive dust. 
stereotype take-over 
* You have noticed that the road is icy and decided to drive 
carefully, but when a dog enters the road you kick the brake and 
• • • 
* An operator enters an emergency procedure and executes a 
sequence of actions correctly but then inappropriately stops a 
pump, an act that follows the sequence in another, more 
frequently used procedure, but here is wrong and risky. 
* An airplane is below acceptable altitude while approaching a 
runway. The pilot orders "full power" and the copilot responds 
correctly but also retracts the landing gear, resulting in a 
"wheels-up" landing. This act normally follows "full power" at 
low altitude during takeoff. 
Familiar association shortcut 
"The incident in question occurred in 1735, nine years after the 
discovery of the planet Uranus, and the principal figure involved 
was the great French astronomer Lalande. In that year Lalande 
failed to discover the planet Neptune, although the logic of 
events should have led him to it. Lalande was making a map of the 
heavens. Zvery night he would observe and record the stars in a 
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small area, and on a following night would repeat the 
observations. Once, in a second mapping of a particular area, he 
found that the position of one star relative to others in that 
part of the map had shifted. Lalande was a good astronomer and 
knew that such a shift was unreasonable. He crossed out his first 
observation of the shifting point of light, put a question mark 
next to his second observation, and let the matter go. And so, 
not until half a century later did Neptune get added to the list 
of planets in the solar system. From the aberrant movement, 
Lalande might have made the inference not that an error had been 
made but that a new planet of the solar system was present. But 
he was reasonable. And it was more reasonable to infer that one 
had made an error in observation than that one had found a new 
planet." 
The incident reveals that Lalande was not open-minded analyzing a 
physical system; he was absorbed in rule-based observation and 
data recording, (cited from Bruner et al., 1956): 
* From a butadine explosion in Texas City; the investigation 
considers: 
"Loss of butadine from the system through the leaking overhead 
line motor valve resulted in substantial changes in tray 
composition The loss of liquid in the base of the column 
uncovered the calandria tubes, allowing the tube wall temperature 
to approach the temperature of the heat supply. The increased 
vinylacetylene concentration and high tube wall temperature set 
the stage for the explosion which followed. ...The make flow 
meter showed a continuous flow; however, the operator assumed 
that the meter was off calibration since the make motor valve was 
closed and the tracing of the chart was a straight line near the 
base of the chart. The column base level indicator showed a low 
level in the base of the column, but ample kettle vapor was being 
generated." 
* An example from the melt-down of fuel elements in a nuclear 
reactor shows the great affinity to familiar signs, even a 
prewarning has been received: 
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"Certain tests required several hundred process coolant tubes to 
be blocked by neoprene disks. Seven disks were left in the system 
after the test, but were located by a test of the gauge system 
that monitors water presssure on each individual process tube. 
For some reason the gauge on one tube was overlooked, and it did 
not appear in a list of abnormal gauge readings prepared during 
the test. There was an additional opportunity to spot the blocked 
tube when a later test was performed on the system. This time the 
pressure for the tube definitely indicated a blocked tube. The 
shift supervisor failed, however, to recognize this indication of 
trouble. The gauge was adjusted at that time by an instrument 
mechanic to give a midscale reading which for that particular 
tube was false. This adjustment made it virtually certain that no 
flow condition would exist until serious damage resulted. 
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